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Abstract 
The world is embracing the idea of Internet of Things and Industrial Revolution 4.0. 
However, this acceptance of computerised evolution is met with a myriad of 
challenges, where consumers of this technology are also growing ever so anxious 
about the security of their personal data as well as reliability of data collected by the 
millions and even billions of sensors surrounding them.  
Wireless sensor networks are the main baseline technology driving Internet of 
things; by their very inherent nature, these networks are too vulnerable to attacks 
and yet the network security tools designed for conventional computer networks are 
not effective in countering these attacks. Wireless sensors have low computational 
resources, may be highly mobile and in most cases, these networks do not have a 
central point which can be marked as an authentication point for the sensors, any 
node can join or leave whenever they want. This leaves the sensors and the internet 
of things applications depending on them highly susceptible to attacks, which may 
compromise consumer information and leave security breaches in situation that need 
absolute security such as homes or even the cars they drive. There are many 
possibilities of things that could go wrong when hackers gain control of sensors in a 
car or a house. 
There have been many solutions offered to address security of Wireless 
Sensor Networks; however, most of those solutions are often not customised for 
African context. Given that most African countries have not kept pace with the 
development of these underlying technologies, blanket adoption of the solutions 
developed for consumption in the developed world has not yielded optimal results. 
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The focus of this research was the development of an Intrusion Detection 
System that works in a hierarchical network structured Wireless Sensor Network, 
where cluster heads oversee groups of nodes and relay their data packets all the 
way to the sink node. This is a reactive Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that makes 
use of a fuzzy logic based algorithm for verification of intrusion detections. This 
system borrows characteristics of traditional Wireless Sensor Networks in that it is 
hosted external to the nodes; that is, on a computer or server connected to the sink 
node. The rational for this is the premise that developing the system in this manner 
optimises the power and processing resource of nodes because no part of the IDS is 
found in the nodes and they are left to focus purely on sensing. 
The Intrusion Detection System makes use of remote Over The Air 
programming to communicate with compromised nodes, to either shut down or 
reboot and is designed with the ZigBee protocol in mind. Additionally, this Intrusion 
Detection System is intended to being part of a larger Internet of Things integration 
framework being proposed at the Central University of Technology. This framework 
is aimed at developing an Internet of Things adoption strategy customised for African 
needs and regionally local consumers. 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the solution, the rate of false detections being 
picked out by the security algorithm were reduced through the use of fuzzy logic 
systems; this resulted in an accuracies of above 90 %. The algorithm is also very 
light when asymptotic notation is applied, making it ideal for Wireless Sensors. 
Lastly, we also put forward the Xbee version of the Triple Modular Redundancy 
architecture, customised for Wireless sensor networks in order to beef-up on the 
security solution presented in this dissertation. 
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1. Background and Motivation 
 1.0 Introduction 
The Internet of Things archetype makes considerable use of Wireless Sensor 
Networks for basic data collection of the deployment environment. The advances in 
Micro Electrical Mechanical Sensor (MEMS) engineering and the widespread 
adoption of wireless communication protocols, for device to device communication, 
have aided immensely in the popularity of wireless sensor network development and 
usage. Unfortunately, wireless sensor networks also provide a new door way for 
malicious software as well as hackers to harm the integrity of data gathered for the 
numerous Internet of Things applications such as home security, farming as well as 
smart city applications such as pollution detection. 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), have protection from malicious intrusion 
from the Internet through means of cryptography and firewalls in some instances.  
However, cryptography techniques cannot detect intrusion from within the network 
as well as physical tampering of a node from within the network. They can also be 
vulnerable to internet-based attacks such as denial of service attacks (DOS). 
The aim of this research was to investigate, discover and enhance or come up 
with an intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect security breaches coming from 
within the WSN as well as those that could by-pass the cryptography security 
measures implemented within the WSN, from the perspective of ZigBee based WSN.  
Additionally, the scope of this research includes an implementation of the IDS 
application as software, followed by controlled experiments for intrusion detection 
tests to evaluate the effectiveness of the IDS.  
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1.1 Background 
Wireless sensor networks have made it easy to visualize and implement a variety of 
novel ideas because of their flexible wireless nature and small portable size. The 
range of applications of WSNs are inclusive of simple every day uses such as 
automated doors; to life critical scenarios such as detection of natural disasters and 
possible overflow of a dam and even military applications, where they are often 
deployed to gather information in  hostile environments (Stankovic & Wood, 2011). 
They can also be used to combat drought (Satish, et al., 2009) which is an 
advantage for the agricultural sector. 
The term Internet of Things (IoT), was first used in a presentation in 1999 by 
Proctor and Gamble employee, Kevin Ashton, when linking the Radio Frequency 
Identifier (RFID) to the Internet (Dassault Systems, 2013). It has now evolved to 
describe a sector of information technology and research aimed at connecting all 
objects, electronic or living organisms, to the Internet (Lopez Research, 2014), with 
the aim of efficient communication of all interconnected objects. Each device or 
organism will have its own unique identification (in the form of an IP address) such 
that it can connect to the internet (David, et al., 2012). WSNs are a crucial aspect in 
the realization of the IoT implementation because sensor devices are small, portable 
and can be implemented in a variety of applications. 
It is imperative therefore to conclude that WSNs have to remain as secure as 
possible from any form of intrusion or security breaches (Butun & Morgera, 2014). 
This will bring a sense of acceptance from the end users entering the era of the 
Internet of Things (IoT), who should also be confident that the information they 
receive is reliable and not tampered with. 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
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For example, a farmer using a WSN to automate the irrigation system should 
have full confidence that the sensors will not let the soil dry beyond the desired point 
or let plants wither in heat before deploying the sprinkler system or alerting the 
farmer. Likewise, the military should be confident that information received from 
sensors has not been tampered with by enemies to give wrong information, as well 
as a dam relying on sensors to warn of a possible flooding before it happens (Seal, 
et al., 2012). 
The type of security threats usually directed at WSNs can be classified by 
schemes such as Outsider-Insider and passive-active (Lee, et al., 2012). An 
example of an Outsider attack could be one coming from the Internet which could be 
active in harming the nature of the network such as Denial of Service (DOS) attack 
(Krishnan, 2014) or passive such as the listening of an authorized user 
authentication’s details. On the other hand, Insider attacks range from situations 
where someone physically captures a node and reprograms it such that it gives 
wrong information or for it to harm the integrity of the network from within (Honus, 
2009), to someone, authorized with encryptions keys, using software to inject 
malicious software into the network (Lee, et al., 2012). 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have long been researched on and 
employed in networked systems as secondary security measure to encryption 
mechanisms that usually focus on Outsider attacks (Soliman, 2012). They aim at 
detecting threats to the network and to report these threats, such that an action is 
performed to prevent threats before much damage is inflicted to the network 
(Priyanka, 2013). They can also keep a log of all threats to a network which could be 
vital for analysis purposes (Strikos, 2007). 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
Africa, as a continent, has always lacked behind when matters of technological 
advancements are concerned (Masinde & Bagula, 2015). Generally, technological 
advancements come to Africa once they have been pioneered in other continents 
such as Asia, America and Europe. However, the technologies received from such 
continents are usually not augmented to be specific for the needs of Africa and the 
African landscape. For WSNs to be trusted in the African consumer markets, their 
security solutions should be customised to be compatible with African needs. 
Given the above background information, it is evident that; there is need to 
develop or enhance existing IDS to improve on general knowledge in the realm of 
IDS technology, in the quest to come up with an exceptionally resource friendly IDS 
for WSNs. The IDS chosen should be portable and light enough, computational cost-
wise, to work efficiently given the limited resources inherent in WSNs, given the 
possibility of remote deployment in Africa. Additionally, the IDS should also be 
effective enough to detect if one or more of the nodes has been physically or 
otherwise breached, as well as to detect if the traffic coming from the network side is 
not one that can constitute a DOS attack or some passive listening to pick up end-
user authentication. 
Furthermore, the resulting IDS should be compatible with the framework in 
(Masinde, 2013). 
1.3 Motivation for the Research 
The motivation of this study was partially the prospect of being a part of a larger 
research project inclined towards creating a generic integration framework for IoT, 
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which is to be optimised for developing African countries, at the Central University of 
Technology, Bloemfontein, South Africa (Masinde, 2013). 
The proposed integration framework will consist of four (4) layers, governed 
by the three components of the Service Oriented Architecture (SOA); service 
description, service advertisement and service composition respectively (Jiehan, et 
al., 2007). Layer 1 of the four layers consist of Information Generators such as 
WSNs, people and other objects that can produce the raw data being recorded for a 
specific domain, such as thermometer in weather applications. Layer 2 has the main 
task of integrating all the raw information from a variety of information generators 
from layer 1. Since the framework will be generic but used across different 
applications, layer 3 is the first application specific layer that receives the integrated 
data from layer 2. Layer 3 will be specific for the needs of each unique application. 
Layer 4 is the layer responsible for formatting the information output to a specific 
output device, ranging from computers, mobile phones or loud speakers and any 
other way that may benefit the end users. 
 
Figure 1-1 Proposed IOT integration architecture at Central University of Technology 
(Masinde, 2013) 
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1.4 The Solution 
An existing algorithm that had been used to combat flood attacks in ZigBee powered 
sensors was enhanced with fuzzy logic to create a desktop IDS for WSNs with a 
build in database. The ZigBee gateway device for a network connects to this 
application and even stores sensor data into the database for third party applications 
to use once the data has been considered legitimate. 
The IDS developed is a reactive software and makes use of over the air 
programing (OTA) to either reset or shut down offending sensors motes. This 
dissertation documents all the steps taken to arrive at the solution.  
1.5 Objectives of the Research 
The overall objective of this research was to enhance and implement an intrusion 
detection algorithm for wireless sensor networks in the Internet of Things integration 
architecture.  This was achieved through the following sub-objectives. 
1. To investigate and analyse the concepts and designs of existing intrusion 
detection system in relation to WSNs.  
2. To enhance an intrusion detection algorithm, as part of designing an intrusion 
detection mechanism, to improve security within WSNs. This algorithm should 
be: 
i. Able to deal with Jamming, Flooding and De-synchronization attacks, 
of which all fall under the Denial of Service, attack (DoS). 
ii. Light-weight and able to work well given the limited processing 
capabilities of WSNs while being as energy efficient as possible. 
That is because nodes within WSNs use batteries that could be 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
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difficult to charge, if a WSN is deployed in a hostile area or if too 
many have been deployed over an area. 
iii. Compatible with the framework (Masinde, 2013) 
3. To implement and evaluate the intrusion detection algorithm 
1.51 Research Questions 
The research objectives were achieved by answering the following research 
questions: 
1. What are the existing IDS that are relevant to WSNs? 
2. To what extent does the physical placement of IDS in the network affect the 
efficiency of IDS? 
3. Which artificial intelligence notation can be used in WSN development? 
 
1.6 Methodology of Research and Evaluation Criteria 
The work presented in this dissertation is in the form of an experimental research 
with the aim of enhancing an existing IDS algorithm. 
With Algorithm enhancement, a dynamic algorithm, found to be suitable, was 
improved and analysed to determine both its correctness (as intrusions detector) and 
efficiency (computational time and computer resources consumption). The algorithm 
was considered correct with respect to intrusion detection because for every 
instance of the inputs (that is, when the specified properties of the inputs are 
satisfied), the algorithm halts, and the outputs produced satisfy the specified 
input/output relation. This algorithm was first augmented with properties of fuzzy 
logic and realised (coded), as part of an Intrusion Detection System software.  
© Central University of Technology, Free State
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The implemented algorithm is used to run various tests to determine its 
performance. The scope of this project does not allow for the IDS solution to be 
tested on real physical outdoor applications but rather in a controlled environment 
where a threat can be simulated when and as needed. 
Further experiments are carried out to determine the performance of the 
planned IDS, when dealing with varying intensities of Internal and External flood 
threats. Internal Threats are inclusive of physical tampering. In this instance, the IDS 
is evaluated on how quick it can detect a node being compromised and how quick it 
can offer a solution. 
The results from the experiments are used in conducting an assessment, 
where relevance of threat, adequacy of information about threat provided to 
administrator, frequency of false and positive alarms and the number of steps used 
by the IDS to identify an intrusion are evaluated.  
1.7 Limitation of the study 
The evaluation of the algorithm is done indoors with limited number of nodes and 
simulated attacks as opposed to using real threats. The use of real world threats as 
a method for measurement could have only been possible if this was a study over a 
relatively long period of time. This limitation also implies that the evaluation could 
end up with results that are not a true perfect representation of threats in the real 
world.  
1.8 Contributions of the Research 
This research is instrumental in creating a dynamic custom-made security API and to 
make a contribution towards the development of a localised generic WSN 
applications integration architecture within the IoT paradigm. Furthermore, it will 
bring forth confidence, to end users of WSN based networks, that information 
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harvested from networks is tamper free and those threats, which can compromise 
the integrity of the network, are drastically minimised.  
Additionally, a customised approach in the development and deployment of 
the IDS will enhance the maintainability of a locally designed application of WSNs. 
The result of this research is a dynamic, reactive Intrusion Detection System 
for ZigBee powered WSNs aimed specifically at ZigBee flood attacks. The IDS uses 
fuzzy logic to maximise accuracy. The IDS is resource friendly with regard to actual 
sensors as it is hosted externally to the network, but at the point in the network 
where all the data eventually ends. There is also a database that is ready to connect 
with third party applications that consume information coming from the network. 
. 
 
1.9 Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation is structured to give every detail of the development of the IDS, to 
the testing of the completed solution. 
Chapter 2-is the literature review: This is a review of the associated literature, 
pertaining to WSN, the IoT phenomenon, and threads directed at WSN, 
communication protocols used in WSN as well as proposed security solutions for 
WSN. On the issue of security we also explore literature behind the use of artificial 
intelligence notations to enhance security in WSN.   
Chapter 3- Methodology: This chapter describes the research methods that 
were used in this study, also with justification for the selected approach. 
Chapter 4- IDS Design: The chapter documents the design behind all the 
components that make up the final solution. 
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Chapter 5-Implementation: This chapter gives a description of how the 
algorithm was enhanced and coded into a working solution. It also describes how the 
various components work together to produce make one product. 
Chapter 6- Evaluations, Discussions and Conclusions: This chapter describes 
the tests that were used to evaluate the IDS, the possible enhancements to the IDS 
as well as the conclusion of the dissertation. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of networks mainly composed of 
autonomous sensors for measuring a variety of data such as habitat and ecosystem 
monitoring, seismic monitoring, ground water contamination, water acidity and even 
civil structural health monitoring (Bhaskar, 2005). These sensors use diverse 
communications technologies such as Bluetooth, ZigBee, General Packet Radio 
Service (GPRS) and Wi-Fi (Libelium, 2016), to connect to the sink nodes, which are 
control nodes that are connected to computers or the Internet. Most of the sensors 
are small and easy to implement in a variety of surfaces, devices as well as existing 
infrastructure. This is the basis of the phenomenon referred to as Internet of Things 
(IoT). With IoT, everyday appliances and electronic devices are being fitted with 
sensors that relay the information they monitor to communication devices that end-
users can interact with such as computers and cell phones (Weber & Richard, 2016).  
This IoT sensation is giving birth to and driving forth innovative ideas such as 
smart cities, smart farming as well as automation of everyday devices in a home 
scenario. For example, in a smart city, traffic operation could work with embedded 
sensors that can alert motorists about busy routes, roads that have experienced an 
accident, the average speed of cars moving on a certain road as well as alternative 
roads that can be utilised in cases of emergency (Nikita, et al., 2016). 
Additionally, city councils could be alerted automatically by dustbins when it is 
time to collect trash. In the home scenario, fridges are already being implemented 
with sensors to detect where there is shortage of certain items (Prapulla, et al., 
2015). This idea can further be expanded to a point where the fridge can make an 
order, automatically, of the depleted item, on behalf of the owner. This is a brief 
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indication of the possibility of numerous ideas that will be brought to fruition when IoT 
is fully embraced and applied. 
The advent of IPv6 is also another driving force behind IoT as hundreds, 
thousands, millions and even billions of sensors will be able to connect to the 
Internet without the fear that the Internet Protocol will run out of address space 
(Antonio, et al., 2013). 
When sensor nodes were first developed, they made use of simplex 
communication channels, that is, they could only sent signals to the sink nodes and 
not vice versa. Newer models are bidirectional meaning that communication between 
a sensor and a node or computer happens in a half-duplex or full duplex scheme 
(Silva Girão & Enache, 2007). However, to remain effective when deployed, these 
WSNs need protection from intrusions and pervasive attacks directed at defilement 
of their integrity. 
This chapter therefore presents and discusses network security in the form of 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) as well as WSN specific IDS, with particular 
reference to algorithms used for detection of intrusions.  
Additionally, this chapter is divided into the following sections. Section 2.2 is 
dedicated to Wireless Sensor Networks, detailing their usage and their various 
deployment topologies. Section 2.3 look at the aspects considered in the design of 
algorithms used in intrusion detection as well their analysis. Section 2.4 and 2.5 
discuss Intrusion detection systems and algorithms as well as a special focus on 
WSN IDS algorithms respectively in section 2.6.  WSN simulators are discussed in 
section 2.7. In section 2.8 we discuss the protocol used in our approach to intrusion 
detection. Related work is presented in section 2.9. 
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2.2 Wireless Sensor Networks  
WSNs can be deployed in a variety of topologies, such as star and mesh topology, 
depending on the preference and needs of the people using the sensors 
(Kosmerchock, 2012). For instance, in a star topology, all sensors connect to the 
sink node while in a mesh topology nodes can also communicate within themselves. 
Generally, there are two main network structures of wireless sensor nodes, being flat 
as well as hierarchical network structures (Abduvaliyev, et al., 2013). This research, 
however, gravitates towards study of the latter in an attempt to satisfy the aims set 
by the research. Under Hierarchical network structures there are tree, cluster as well 
as hierarchical tree networks. 
2.2.1Tree network architecture 
In this architecture, the base station of the network, being the main node connected 
to a computer or Internet for data analysis and aggregation, acts as the main parent 
of the network. WSNs work by relaying data packets from one node to a higher node 
in the network towards the base station, with each relay called a hop. The higher 
node acts as the parent of the lower node, as can be seen in Figure 2.1 below.  
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Figure 2-1The Tree Network Structure 
  
 
2.2.2 Cluster network architecture 
With the cluster network structure, there is division of nodes into smaller groups 
called clusters, where each cluster has a managing node called a cluster head that 
communicates directly with the base station, as can be seen in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2-2Cluster Network structure  
2.2.3 Hierarchical Tree Network Structure 
In this topology network, there exist clusters of nodes where each cluster head 
communicates directly with the base station. Additionally, each cluster head acts as 
a parent node to group of nodes, the nodes in this scenario must be grouped in a 
fashion similar to that of a tree network structure. Figure 2.3 shows an example of a 
Cluster network. 
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Figure 2-3 Hierarchical Tree Network Structure 
2.3 Design and Analysis of Algorithm 
Algorithm design can be described as a precise technique for creating a 
mathematical process for solving problems (Levitin, 2003). The success or the 
effectiveness of an algorithm is determined by its run time also commonly known as 
the BIG-OH (Mount, 2003). Big-oh (O) is used to check the efficiency of an algorithm 
in terms of processing time and memory requirements with varying input sizes (Kalle, 
et al., 2014). 
Essentially, when dealing with algorithm analysis, the number of steps taken 
by an algorithm, to execute inputs of varying magnitudes are counted with the best, 
worst and average case complexities being determined (Tovey, 2002). 
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                 2.3.1 Best, Worst and Average case Complexities of algorithms 
 
Figure 2-4 Best, Worst and Average Case Complexities. Image Source: (Anon., 
1997) 
For instance, one may consider an algorithm that searches for a certain key 
from the input set consisting of all possible sizes of the search interest, represented 
on the x-axis as shown in figure 2.4 above. The y-axis represents the number of 
steps the algorithm would need to take in order to find the key being searched for.  In 
this scenario, the worst-case complexity of the algorithm is given by the function that 
takes the maximum number of steps with any given size of input, to find the search 
key, as can be seen in the graph. Conversely, the best-case complexity of the 
algorithm is produced by the function that takes the least number of steps to find a 
search key, given any size of the input. Finally, the average case complexity of the 
algorithm is specified by the function that takes the average number of steps to 
produce the desired output, given any size of input. 
Nevertheless, in practice, the worst-case scenario is usually the measure that 
really counts, because it determines just how poor an algorithm can ever perform 
given any size of input (Engblom, 2002). 
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Thus said, it has been pointed out that when working with best-average-worst 
case complexities, it is often complex to figure out the exact number of a computer’s 
random access memory  executions because of the need to have much detailed 
information as well as specifications such as the approach used when coding the 
algorithm (Shaffer, 2009). This is where the Big-Oh notation comes in handy 
because it is simpler to describe the efficiency of an algorithm using basic upper and 
lower bounds of time complexity. Additionally, the big-oh places an abstraction on 
algorithm analysis that ignores details that have no impact in the comparison of 
algorithms (Jones & Pevzner, 2004).   
For example, given an algorithm function with a multiplicative constant g(n) 
=3n and one without a constant multiplier, such as f(n) =n, the big-oh ignores the 
multiplicative constant and sees them as similar. This in fact makes sense when 
dealing with coding the algorithms in two different languages because the 
multiplicative constant would tell us nothing about the algorithm when one runs 3 
times as fast in one language as compared to the other in a different language 
(Jones & Pevzner, 2004).  
The formal definitions for big-oh can be given as follows (Koffman & Wolfgang, 
2010); 
 Upper bound (big-oh):  f (n) = O (g (n)) means c*g (n) is an upper bound on f 
(n). This means that there exists a constant c such that f (n) is always <= c*g 
(n) where n>=n0 for some constant n. 
 Lower bound (big-omega): f (n) =Ω (g (n)) means c*g (n) is a lower bound on f 
(n). This means that there exists a constant c such that f (n) is always >=c*g 
(n) for all n>=n0. 
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 Big-Theta: f (n) = Ɵ (g (n)) means there exist constants c1 and c2 such that 
c1*g (n) is an upper bound on f (n) and c2*g (n) is a lower bound on f (n) for all 
n>=n0. In short f (n) <=C1*g (n) and f (n)>= C2*g (n). This roughly put means 
that g (n) is bound averagely around f (n). 
Examples of the above are defined as follows: 
Big-Oh 
 6n2-100n+9=O (n2) when c=3.  3n2>6n2-100n+9 
 6n2-100n+9=O (n3) when c=1 and n> 3 then n3 >6n2-100n+9. 
 6n2-100n+9≠O (n)  because for any C chosen where n>c, c*n<6n2 
Big-Omega 
 6n2-100n+9=Ω (n2) when c=2 and n>100 then 2n2 <6n2-100n+9. 
 6n2-100n+9≠Ω (n3) if c=1 and n>3 then 6n2-100n+9< n3   
 6n2-100n+9= Ω (n) for any c chosen because c*n<6n2-100n+9 when n>100c 
Big-Theta 
 6n2-100n+9=Ɵ (n2) because it is both in O and Ω. 
 6n2-100n+9≠Ɵ (n3 ) because it is only in Big-Oh 
 6n2-100n+9≠Ɵ (n ) because it is only in Big-Omega 
Therefore, based on the above definitions, better conclusions can be drawn 
when functions are compared in terms of efficiency, given large enough or 
continuously increasing input. When used as part of an intrusion detection system, 
for example, algorithm analysis could be invaluable in the testing stage or simulation 
stage when checking how the algorithm will behave over time even with growing 
amounts of data packets being sent or an increase in intrusions. 
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2.4 Intrusion Detection Systems and Algorithms 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) could be in the form of hardware or 
software, and were introduced as a secondary security for networks (Ning & Jajodia, 
2002). This is because IDS are more concerned about finding or sniffing out 
intrusions before or as they happen and alerting system administrators as opposed 
to just focusing on securing transmission of data,  carried out using encryption 
schemes (SANS Institude, 2001). This is why encryption schemes are considered to 
be the first level of security for networks. Intrusion detection systems have been 
used for wired networks but with the introduction of WSNs, a need has risen to have 
intrusion detection systems in wireless networks as well (Khan, et al., 2014). 
To make clear the need to have Intrusions Detection Systems in networks, it 
is important to outline the types of intrusions and the reasons as to why systems 
need to be protected from them. 
The concept of intrusion was introduced in the 1980’s and described as a 
deliberate unauthorised attempt to gain access to secured information, manipulate 
the information or render the system unusable or useless (Neethu, 2013). 
2.4.1 Types of Intrusions 
Various intrusions have been designed to cause harm to computer systems. These 
intrusions have been classified according to their attacking techniques (Cort, 2004). 
 Exploits- these are hidden bugs within code of system or servers which will 
later allow the intruder to gain unauthorised access to a system 
 Reconnaissance attacks-these attack types aim at finding weaknesses in 
system and to exploit such a weakness to gain access to systems.  
 Denials of Service attacks- these kinds of attacks are build such that they 
flood the system with unnecessary requests until said system crashes. 
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However, the above-mentioned only form half of the class of intrusions, as they 
all fall under attacks directed to the system from outside the network. Some attacks 
however, do come from within the network and are classified as insider attacks 
(Probst, 2011). A user who already has authorization usually initiates insider attacks 
and this user could be anyone from a disgruntled employee to an employee who has 
retired or changed jobs (Rupert, 2009). 
 
2.4.2 Intrusion detection systems (IDS) 
 
An IDS is a system, which monitors data traffic coming in and out of a network to 
determine if there has been intrusions or attacks (Liao, et al., 2013). In the event of 
an apparent attack, some IDS are designed to alert system administrators who, in 
turn, take the appropriate response to protect data, while some IDS are programmed 
to act accordingly on their own in the case of an apparent attack (Cort, 2004). 
These IDS can be categorised according to area of deployment in a system, 
form or reaction to an intrusion as well as detection technique. For example, when 
referring to area of deployment, which is the major classifier of IDS, the IDS could be 
Host based or Network based. These titles are self-explanatory in the sense that with 
Host based IDS, the IDS is installed on a particular node of a network, be it a work 
station or peripheral, to monitor traffic (Letou, et al., 2013). 
On the other hand, Network based IDS are installed on strategic points of the 
network to monitor traffic passing through the network (Amiri, et al., 2011). However, 
both of these implementations have drawbacks. For instance, with Host Based IDS, 
one of the disadvantages include the fact that they can be difficult to maintain in a 
large network that has multiple computers and nodes, as the IDS is on every node of 
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the network (Innella, 2001). This also means it is difficult to analyse attack attempts if 
many computers in a network are targeted. Additionally, Host Based IDS have the 
problem of interoperability and portability because they need to be installed on 
operating systems of different manufactures in a network (Sharma & Sinha, 2011). 
This implies that there will be instances of operation, when some operating systems 
that control nodes in a network are not compatible with the IDS especially in a large 
network setting. This fact of the IDS needing an operating system to operate on 
means that when attackers find vulnerability in the OS platform, they can use it as a 
back door to the IDS and destroy it from within. These types of attacks are very hard 
to trace and they leave vulnerability that is difficult to rectify. Furthermore, Host 
Based IDS are very poor at sniffing out outsider attacks (Anon., 2005). 
Moreover, Host based IDS are not usually resource friendly. For example, 
most Host based IDS need to keep a record of system audit trails to find a source of 
intrusion and usually this ends up being a growing database that takes much system 
space as well as increasing Host Server load (Anon., 2005). However, this is a two-
sided affair as Host based IDS make it easy to trace the source of intrusions, and 
this is a good feature when finding Insider attacks. Additionally, based on stored 
audit trails of a node in a network, if a node has been under attack previously, a 
similar reoccurrence can be sniffed out and stopped as it happens or before it 
happens. Moreover, all traffic to such a node can be stopped as a preventive 
measure. An example of a Host Based IDS is CyberSafe (Anon., 2014). 
Network IDS on the other hand have the disadvantage that, since they have 
to monitor every packet in the network for known signs of intrusions, they sometimes 
have trouble doing this in networks at very high speeds (Li, et al., 2005). This does 
not seem like a problem that will go away soon as Internet and network speeds are 
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constantly increasing with the evolution of technology. Furthermore, Network based 
IDS have to identify certain known signatures of attacks from packet traffic, implying 
that unknown or novel intrusions can go unnoticed and these are the ones that 
cause much harm (Li, et al., 2005). This is also amplified by the fact that there are 
just too many known attacks to be programmed into one IDS during creation (Anon., 
2005). Network IDS tend to also be ineffective in networks where data packets are 
encrypted as they cannot evaluate packets for known signatures (Draˇsar & Vykopal, 
2013). 
However, just as in Host based IDS, Network based IDS also have their 
merits. For instance, as opposed to Host based IDS weakness of portability, Network 
based IDS are independent of platform on which they are running, making them 
desirable in large network settings that incorporate different operating system 
architectures (Albag, 2001). It has been stated that they are a lot easier to install and 
to have up and running in a relatively short time-frame (Bowden, 2007). This could 
be a useful feature in a setting where the deployment topologies are ever changing 
or there is re-scaling of a corporation. One example of a Host based IDS is Snort 
(Inella, 2001). 
As an alternative, there are Hybrid IDS that try to combine the advantages of 
both approaches to provide the optimum solution for intrusion prevention. For 
example, a hybrid IDS would be able to check if a data packet is suspicious as in 
Network based IDS, ascertain as to whether it has been stored as a known attack 
and even provide tracing ability as in Host based IDS, to find the source of the attack 
(Aydin, et al., 2009).Table 2.1 displays the advantages and disadvantages of Host 
Based IDS as well as Network Based IDS. 
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Table 2-1 Advantages and Disadvantages of Host IDS and Network IDS 
Classification of IDS Advantages Disadvantages 
Network Based IDS  -Platform Independent 
-Relatively easy to 
configure and set up 
-trouble coping with high 
speed networks 
-Novel attacks may go 
undetected 
Host Based IDS -can easily trace Inside 
attacks 
-stored audit trails makes 
it easy to combat re 
occurring attacks 
-difficult to maintain in 
large area 
-Not resource friendly 
 
With regard to type of reaction to intrusion, the IDS, be it Network or Host based can 
take one of two forms. It can have a passive reaction to an intrusion or it can be 
reactive in nature. 
Passive reaction IDS respond to an intrusion by keeping a record of the 
intrusion and alerting the system administrator to take a preventive measure. 
Reactive IDS, however, usually respond by taking off the infected node from the 
network or re setting the connection from the infected node (Kumar & Chhabra, 
2014). 
Finally, there are also two types of detection techniques deployed in intrusion 
detection system. These are anomaly and signature detection techniques. With 
Anomaly Detection Technique, data packets are inspected in a network or from a 
node, for deviation from a set baseline that is deemed normal (Jyothsna & Rama, 
2011). If the traffic is considered abnormal, an alarm is raised. 
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On the other hand, with Signature Based detection techniques, the IDS 
checks the data traffic in a network or from a node, for known sets of attack patterns, 
stored in its database. If a match is found an alarm is raised (Gaikwad, et al., 2012). 
2.4.3 Algorithms used in Intrusion Detection 
Various algorithms are used for the detection of impositions in intrusion 
detection systems. Most of these algorithms are borrowed from data mining 
algorithms and statistical analysis algorithms as they work similarly in data 
aggregation and analysis. For example, some popular algorithms from data mining 
such as fuzzy logic and genetic algorithms are used for anomaly detection (Hassan, 
2013). 
Fuzzy logic algorithms use rule-based logic to find information about the 
state of a system even when incomplete data is provided, because they try to 
incorporate the dynamics of human reason (Taylor & Meldrum, 2000). This 
characteristic makes them to not give answers as strict yes or not but also 
possibilities of the in between. Fuzzy logic systems therefore, can give computers 
the ability to produce calculated reasoning in a way similar to how a human would 
think (Pasupathi & Nishanth, 2014). There are not just black and white areas of 
logical deductions in fuzzy logic as grey areas, or the in between possibilities are 
accommodated for. 
Fuzzy logic also gives computers a chance to make conclusion about a 
situation even when partial information, about that situation, is given (Johnson, 
2002). For example, if a human were to somehow act as an IDS they would realise 
when a sensor is actually acting up and cannot be trusted, or if the sensor just needs 
to be rebooted, or isolated completely. This is very same concept that the fuzzy logic 
module brings into this application. The ability for a human to reason and to evaluate 
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situations such as temperature as either hot, warm, mild or very cold, is afforded to 
computers through concepts of fuzzy logic. 
Genetic algorithms, on the other hand, are inspired by the natural evolution 
of living organisms that include natural selection, inheritance and mutation (Scrucca, 
2013). As such, they have been used to find solutions to search problems in 
computer sciences. Selection, inheritance and mutation mechanisms are the building 
blocks of genetic algorithms. With selection, a solution that is considered best has a 
higher chance of being selected in a search solution state. In inheritance, old 
solutions are combined to form new ones and in mutation, there are random 
changes done to the solutions space domain in a bit to keep evolving the best 
answer and making it the optimal answer (Ranjan Srivastava & Kim, 2009). 
Statistical algorithms work by finding a deviation from a traffic pattern, when 
used in intrusion detection systems. This deviation is considered an anomaly (Obaid 
Amin, et al., 2009). An example of a statistical algorithm that can be used in intrusion 
detection system is the Cusum (Ravi, 2014). Cusum literally means cumulative sum 
and it is defined below. 
Let n be a sample size greater or equal to 1 (n>=1) 
Equation 2.1 Cusum evaluation 
0
1
( )
i
j
i XS 

 
 
Where X  is the average of the Jth  sample and 0  is the in control system mean. If 
the Cusum value revolves around 0, the system is in control but if mean shifts value. 
For example if 1 > 0 or 1 < 0 , it means the system is in abnormal state. 
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2.5 Intrusion Detection for Wireless Sensor Networks 
Intrusion detection systems for WSNs work similarly to their wired counterparts and 
can even deploy similar algorithms and architectures, such as use of mobile agents 
(Vyavhare, et al., 2012). However, for IDS to be effective in WSNs, they have to be 
very efficient to cater for the limited resources in WSNs (Pleskonjic, 2003).  
WSNs are more vulnerable to intrusions than wired networks. This is amplified 
by the fact that they can be physically captured and re-programmed or have their 
wireless signals interrupted and attacked (Mitrokotsa, 2008). It is important to 
understand the differences between wired networks and WSNs as well as how an 
intrusion detection system functions in wired networks as opposed to how it would 
work in a WSN. 
For instance, some advanced intrusion detection systems in wired networks 
can detect an intrusion on a node in a network and alert all surrounding nodes to cut 
communication with such a node (Anon., 2016).  
The problem arises as those IDS solutions cannot be directly applicable to 
solving security problems in WSNs. WSNs possess limitations such as power, 
memory and battery life (Abduvaliyev, et al., 2013). This implies that it is imperative 
for intrusions detection systems to be exceptionally lightweight, first, if they are to be 
of any use to a WSN. 
To understand why there is need for intrusion detection systems in WSNs, it is 
also important to look at some of the types of intrusions normally targeted at WSNs 
as well as brief explanations about their nature. Below are types of intrusions in 
WSNs 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
 28 
 
2.5.1 Physical tampering 
 As previously mentioned, tampering of the hardware of the wireless sensor nodes 
remains one of the biggest problems targeted at the WSNs as there is little to be 
done to prevent it from ever happening (Padmavathi & Shanmugapriya, 2009). 
2.5.2 Black Hole attack 
Nodes in a wireless network set-up work by routing messages through shortest 
paths all the way to the sink. In this attack, a malicious node works to pull all traffic 
towards itself. It first listens to all routing requests and replies to a victim node, with 
the messages that it has the shortest path to the sink. From there, it can choose 
whether it wishes to drop all those packets (Gondwal & Diwaker, 2013). This is 
harmful to the integrity of the network if for instance, the base station never gets the 
data packets. The data from the subject monitored would all be lost. 
2.5.3 Node replication attacks 
In the case that a node is physically captured and its cryptography schemes 
deciphered, an attacker would have power to replicate one of the nodes and use that 
node to send unwanted information through the network (Khan, 2013). 
2.5.4 Hello Flood attacks 
WSNs usually work by sending a packet from one sensor to another until the final 
destination, when deployed in large numbers over a wide area. For this to happen, 
the node wishing to send data uses its routing protocol to send a Hello “message” to 
all nearby nodes to find the nearest neighbour. The neighbouring node then 
responds and if it is indeed the most nearest, the data packet is passed onto it. 
With this kind of attack, this very same concept is exploited. Here an attacker 
that has enough power may keep sending Hello “messages” over a large field of 
sensor nodes with the purpose of flooding them (Pal Singh, et al., 2010). All nodes 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
 29 
 
that receive the Hello will try to establish contact with the attacking node endlessly 
without knowing they are being flooded and this creates traffic within the network, as 
most legitimate nodes will fail to access the data transfer channel. 
2.5.5 Wormhole attack 
This particular attack is dangerous, as it does not need any node to be 
compromised, for it to work. In a wireless network setting, all packets being 
transmitted have a potential to be overheard and in this instance, the attacker merely 
makes an offer to sensor nodes to provide a path to base station with the most 
minimal number of hops (Buch & Jinwala, 2011). It can then transfer these packets 
to any other location through wireless media, meaning that there is capturing of 
important information. Instead of the information being directed to the base station, it 
is then sent toward the location the attacker wants. 
2.5.6 Sybil attack 
With this kind of attack, a malicious node pretends to be two or more nodes within 
the network using their legitimate identities (Abirami.K & Santhi.B, 2013). This 
effectively kills the collaborative nature of the setup of WSNs, as nodes in a sensor 
network work by relying on each other. 
2.5.7 Other Attack Types 
All the above intrusions are considered well known or well researched, however 
there is a whole new class of intrusions directed at WSNs of which are less known. 
Given below is a summary of the lesser-known attacks (Abduvaliyev, et al., 2013). 
Fabrication during reprograming- Many advanced sensors allow re-
programming of the sensors and at times while still in field deployment. This re-
programming is often carried out remotely, often. This feature becomes vital for 
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fabrication attacks, which are possible when an intruder manages to get into the 
network and re-programs the nodes without physically altering them. 
External stimuli-In some WSNs, some stimuli are considered of higher 
importance and when they occur, they are given precedence over all packets in the 
channels to the base station. For example, if sensors are doing seismic monitoring 
and a particular high reading occurs. When used as an attack, the attacker keeps 
sending frequent fake stimuli of high importance to the network, possibly causing a 
jam. 
Homing- With homing, the attacker targets the cluster heads to use them for 
listening on the sensor nodes. Cluster heads are responsible for managing a certain 
batch of nodes in a region. 
Neglect and greet- with this attack, a compromised node tends to give 
priority and precedence to its data packets as opposed to helping relaying packets 
from other sensors. It will also develop a tendency to drop all packets from other 
sensors after acknowledging and accepting them. 
Forced delay- with this attack, a compromised node will hold on to data 
packets before sending them. This attack is made with the intention to make the 
network slow and to lower its integrity. 
Unfairness- Finally, with this attack, a node is made to miss its transmission 
deadline when it has requested the use of the data packet transfer channel. Table 
2.2 is a summary of the above mentioned attacks in WSNs. 
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Table 2-2 Attacks aimed at WSNs 
Common WSN attacks Less Common WSN attacks 
Physical Tampering Fabrication during programming 
Black Hole Attack External stimuli 
Node Replication Homing 
Hello-Flood Neglect and greet 
Wormhole Forced delay 
Sybil Unfairness 
 
2.6. Intrusion Detection systems for Wireless Sensor networks 
This sub section looks at some of the Intrusion Detection Systems that have been 
proposed for WSNs as well as their drawbacks and advantages. 
There are three major classes of intrusion detection techniques that have 
been used for protection of WSNs. These are misuse detection, specification based 
detection as well as anomaly detection schemes. 
2.6.1 Anomaly Detection schemes; 
There are several Intrusion detection systems for WSNs classified under anomaly 
detection schemes. With anomaly detection schemes, just as in wired network 
intrusion detection systems, there is a set of rules of what is considered normal and 
if packets transmitted do not conform to such a threshold, an alarm is raised (Islam & 
AshiqurRahman, 2011). Below is a collection of examples of such intrusion detection 
schemes. 
Statistical Model-Based approach- A sensor builds a model idea about its 
neighbouring nodes as well as packets they are to expect from such a neighbour. If 
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packets do not match with what is expected from the neighbour, they are discarded 
(Onat & Miri, 2005). 
Centralised approach - An intrusion detection system is implemented at the 
base station with a collection of information about all nodes and their functional 
status and all this information is used to check for anomalies (Abduvaliyev, et al., 
2013). 
Clustering algorithm approach-A fixed-width clustering algorithm is used to 
model normal behaviour of sensor clusters. If sampled packet size of a cluster is less 
than the threshold value, it is considered an anomaly (Loo, et al., 2006). 
Isolation Table - This is a hierarchical system that includes the base station, 
cluster heads as well as nodes. Isolation table records anomalies and the cluster 
heads are responsible for isolating nodes from the network that have been 
compromised. These tables are generated by cluster heads and sent to the base 
station for recording (Chen, et al., 2009).  
 
2.6.2 Specification Detection Schemes; 
These schemes rely on the system administration to specify behaviour that can be 
deemed correct and then monitor the system for behaviours that are not normal. 
Pre-defined watchdog approach-The system makes use of watchdogs 
which are nodes that watch on the behaviours of other nodes. When more than half 
of the watchdogs raise an alarm about a certain node, that node is removed from 
reliable nodes and the base station is made aware of such a move (Krontiris, et al., 
2007). 
Decentralised approach-In decentralised IDS, the system goes into a stage 
of data acquisition, then adding rules to the acquired data followed by intrusion 
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detection, where raised failures are compared with what is referred to as number of 
expected failure to check for a possible occurrence of an intrusion (Da Silva, et al., 
2005). 
2.6.3 Misuse Detection Schemes 
Misuse detection schemes rely on a defined set of attack signatures of which the 
network should be protected against. An example is the Watchdog (Abduvaliyev, et 
al., 2013). With this watchdog intrusion detection, each node has, within it, an IDS 
and every node in the system does not only sent data packets to destination but also 
to all neighbouring nodes which have a job to listen to packets being transmitted 
from that node and checking for stored signatures of attacks. 
Table 2.3 depicts these intrusion detection as well as the mentioned 
examples. 
Table 2-3 Intrusion Detection Scheme Classifications 
Detection Scheme Examples 
Anomaly Detection Scheme -Statistical Model Approach 
-Centralised Approach 
-Clustering approach 
-Isolation Table approach 
Specification detection Scheme -Pre-Defined Watchdog 
-Decentralised approach 
Misuse Detection Scheme -Watchdog approach 
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2.6.4 Limitations of existing Intrusion Detection Systems for 
WSNs 
Most of the mentioned intrusion detection systems above are experimental proposals 
and not real implementations (Krontiris, et al., 2009). Most of them mention 
simulations that have not be provided for, such that everyone can evaluate or 
implement them, making them difficult to study or test beyond the scope in which 
they are mentioned. Everyone is left to be satisfied with what the authors or 
researchers of such methodologies place as proof of their existence. Some 
methodologies such as Game Theory methodology (Agah, et al., 2004) for intrusion 
testing seem to be too heavy or suitable for use with wireless sensor nodes. 
Furthermore, there is still not much being proposed for securing the sensor networks 
from physical tampering. All that exist is proposed mechanisms on what to do once 
such a tamper has occurred. 
2.7 Wireless Sensor Network Simulation Tools 
To test how a WSN works given a certain methodology or how the intrusion 
detection on the network will work, it is much easier, time saving and economical to 
use simulators as opposed to destroying a whole set of nodes for a simple test. It 
makes sense therefore that there is an array of simulators that have been developed 
and used for testing WSNs with each possessing different merit. 
It has been stated that WSN simulator tools can be discrete event simulators, 
which can simulate lots of jobs running on different nodes or they can be trace driven 
simulators which are used in real implemented systems (Yu, 2011) .Thus said, given 
below are some of the WSN simulation tools. 
2.7.1 Network simulator version Two (Ns2) 
This is an open source simulator written in Object oriented C++, it can be used on 
the Linux platform. It falls under discrete event simulators. Its disadvantages include 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
 35 
 
the fact that it is poor with graphics and uses a scripting language that is not easy to 
learn and use quickly (Siraj, et al., 2012). 
2.7.2 Omnet++  
Omnet is written in C++ and it falls under the discrete event simulator class. It can 
run on Unix-based operating systems as well as windows operating systems. It also 
provides a powerful graphical user interface that makes it easy to learn and use 
(Massin, et al., 2010). 
2.7.3 Jsim 
Jsim is a network simulator written in Java, which has a strong graphical user 
interface. It also falls under discrete event simulators. It was not developed for 
simulation of WSNs but it is now being used in WSN testing. It is also open source 
software (Sobeih, et al., 2005). 
2.7.4 Tossim  
Tossim is not a real simulator but an emulator that also falls under the discrete event 
simulator class, written in Python. It is also open source and has a graphical user 
interface. It was developed with the aim of supporting use in WSNs (Levis, et al., 
2003). Unlike simulators that can be run on computers to check how the network will 
behave, emulators need to be run in real nodes (Yu, 2011). 
2.7.5 Atemu 
Atemu is written in C and is an emulator that falls under the discrete event simulator 
class. It provides a graphical user interface. It was developed for use with WSNs, 
and is open source (Baras, 2004). 
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2.7.6 Avora 
Avora is a simulator with no graphical user interface. It was developed to simulate 
WSNs written in Java. It is open source and falls under the discrete event simulators 
class as well (Titzer & Palsberg, 2005). 
All of the above-mentioned emulators and simulators are depicted in Table 
2.4. 
Table 2-4 Wireless Network Simulators and Emulators 
Name Programming 
Language 
Simulation 
Class 
Graphical 
User  
Interface 
Platform  
NS2 C++ Discrete No Linux  
Omnet++ C++ Discrete Yes Unix/windows  
Jsim Java Discrete Yes Windows  
Tossim Python Discrete Yes Sensor 
Nodes 
 
Atemu C Discrete Yes Sensor nodes  
Avora Java Discrete No Java Sensors  
  
2.8 Understanding the ZigBee protocol 
ZigBee is the protocol targeted in the realisation of the IDS of this research. 
Therefore, this subsection is dedicated to giving insight into ZigBee and how it 
functions. 
ZigBee is based on the IEEE 802.15.4, and when broken down, its specification can 
be identified as 802 which is in place for the networking standard; 15 for wireless 
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network and 4 meaning low data transmission rate as well as low power 
consumption rate (Vishwakarma, 2012). 
The architecture of ZigBee is pretty much all of the 802.15.4 stack layers plus 
the additional ZigBee layer at the top most. 
 
 
Figure 2-5 ZigBee Protocol Structure, Source: (Dick, 2016) 
The physical layer of the IEEE 802.15.4 boasts a of variety of smart, robust 
driven features such as the receiving energy detection module, clear channel 
assessment as well as the link quality indicator modules (Kaushal, et al., 2014). The 
protocol can support up to 65 000 nodes in a network because it uses the 64 bit 
IEEE addressing as well as a 16 bit short addressing mechanism (Kumar & Gupta, 
2013). 
The Mac sub layer from IEEE 802.15.4 has a task to control access to the 
radio using the Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance. This layer 
also has authority over the transmission of data packets as it is responsible for 
acknowledgement and retransmission of data packets and the validation of data 
frames (Pan, et al., 2011). To achieve the task of transmission tasks, it outlines four 
frame structures (Bhar, 2015): 
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1. A beacon frame for transmission of frames. 
2. A Mac command frame 
3. The acknowledgement frame 
4. The data frame 
Stacked above the standard layers of the IEEE 802.15.4, in a ZigBee protocol 
are the layers that define ZigBee, namely the APS layer and the ZigBee Device 
Objects layer. The APS layer is tasked with managing application end-point 
addressing in a ZigBee node (Gong, et al., 2014). Given a scenario where more than 
one application resides on a node, the end-point address is a mechanism for 
uniquely targeting a particular application on a node in a network. Messages 
originate from an end-point address of an application on a node, for example, one 
that could be sensing the amount of light in a particular area, and they end up on the 
end point address of the destination application.  
The network layer, as defined by the ZigBee protocol, is responsible for 
addressing and routing of data packets in the network and works cooperatively and 
closely with the Mac layer. It is responsible for starting up of the network, assigning 
address to nodes in the network, storing or routing sequences in a log table, as well 
as ensuring security is maintained in the network. The IDS in this research 
specifically targets this layer, as this is the layer that holds all information related to 
the actual transmission of data packets in the network (Somani & Patel, 2012). 
Consequently, this means that in a ZigBee protocol driven network, 
applications residing on nodes can be uniquely addressed from 1 to 240, with 255 
reserved for broadcasting. Therefore, when sending data from one application to 
another application residing on a different node, the addressing has to contain both 
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the address of the network that uniquely identifies a node and the end point address 
of the needed application on the receiving node. 
The ZigBee Device Object layer on the other hand is responsible for a number 
of tasks including the designation of a node type; as to whether it will be a routing 
node, an end node or a coordinating node. Furthermore, it initialises and participates 
in creation of a network by a node (Malhotra & Manpreet, 2015).   
Table 2.5 shows the performance of ZigBee when compared to other 
communication protocols, to serve as a justification of its selection in realising the 
Intrusion Detection System for this project. 
Table 2-5 ZigBee in comparison to other Network Structures 
 ZigBee Bluetooth Wi-Fi Wireless USB 
Range 10-100 metres 10 metres 50-100 metres 10 metres 
Topology Peer-to-peer, 
mesh, ad-hoc 
or star 
Ad hoc Point-to-hub Point-to-point 
Power 
Consumption 
Low Medium High Low 
Data Rate 240 Kbits/sec 1 Mbits/sec 54 Mbits/sec 63 Kbits/sec 
  
From the table above, it is clear that ZigBee betters other common protocol used for 
wireless communication and therefore a wise choice for the purpose of this project. 
This is essential because the project deals with low powered devices that need to 
transfer data in a large area. 
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2.8.1 ZigBee Flood Attack 
ZigBee has been largely developed to be as secure from common intrusion as 
possible. However it can be forced into a denial of service state or flood through 
hacking. This hack is initiated by capturing of a ZigBee Node, and re programming it 
such that it keeps sending hello messages to the central coordinator and re 
associating itself anew each time with different address. This is done in an attempt to 
fill up quickly the database containing the address space of all the nodes that make 
up the network. The aim is to slow down service to other node such as sending and 
receiving channels and theoretically only one node will be getting served, the node 
that is under the control of a hacker (Markert, et al., 2011). 
2.9 Related Projects 
A lot of research has already been done on the need to have Intrusions Detections 
Systems as a mechanism of ensuring secure networks and the need to build them 
such that they can be efficient enough to be used in WSNs. This is further amplified 
by the fact that there are several angles that are being pursued in the development 
of suitable IDS for each particular network need. For instance, a genetic algorithm 
approach has been used to develop an IDS and pursuant to the objective, received 
desired results (Hoque, 2012).  
Location aware Trust based Detection and Isolation of Compromised node in 
wireless sensor networks (Garth, et al., 2011), is another approach to intrusion 
detection which used a system where reputation-based monitoring is used to carry 
out detection and isolation of malicious nodes from a network. 
It has also been stated that mobile agent based IDS have an advantage over 
their more static counterparts, such as host based IDS, when it comes to anomaly 
detection and use of resources (Hakan, 2012; Bhaumik, 2010). 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the design of the intrusion detection system and the methodology 
chosen by this study is outlined. In section 3.2 the selected quasi-experimental 
research approach is argued for, while Section 3.5 documents the resources used in 
this research. Section 3.6 looks into the instrumentation and procedure. 
 The foremost goal of the study is to create a complete working software 
program for the detection of threats in ZigBee WSN. This study therefore, apart from 
coming up with a working solution, is designed around the assumption that, using 
fuzzy logic for threat detection would result in low false alarms and fast reaction time 
for detection of intrusions. The result of proving or disproving the research 
assumption has a direct impact on the construction of proficient intrusion detection 
software.  
There are some standards for measuring the efficiency of an IDS based on 
how many true detections it manages. True positives (TP) are successful detections 
of real threats directed at the network. A false positive (FP) occurs when a normal 
and harmless operation is detected by the IDS as harmful. Conversely, a true 
negative (TN) exists in a situation where a normal flow of events is seen and 
regarded as normal by the IDS and a false negative (FN) occurs when a harmful 
threat is declared as normal by the IDS (Neha, et al., 2016). Figure 3.1 depicts the 
mentioned scenarios as a matrix. 
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Figure 3-1 Confusion Matrix, source: Mathworks.com 
Based on the above information above, we can calculate the rate of each of 
those parameters in intrusion detection (Neha, et al., 2016). 
i. The False Positive rate (FPR)= FP/(FP+TN) 
ii. False Negative Rate (FNR)= FN/(FN+TPP) 
iii. True Positive Rate (TPR)= TP/(TP+FN) 
iv. True Negative Rate (TNR)=TN/(TN+FP) 
v. Accuracy =TP+TN/(TP+TN+FP+FN) 
vi. Precision=TP/(TP+FP) 
 
Our assumption is to be validated, held true and strengthened if there is an above 
90% accuracy rate and a below 5% false alarm rate. These projections are the 
study’s internal set threshold to measure success or failure of the experiment and 
are not based on any pre-existing standard found in Literature. 
Additionally, this research runs on the assumption that not having intrusion 
detection code directly installed on the sensor nodes would result in the nodes 
running longer before a need for battery recharge. This is because the nodes are 
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used for monitoring purposes only and no extra calculations needed by the IDS are 
carried out in the nodes themselves. 
Consequently, the IDS is network based because, it is installed only on the 
computer or server of which the sensors are connected to. Furthermore, giving the 
IDS some sense of smart thinking in the form of fuzzy logic, or another artificial 
intelligence notation can give the IDS more accuracy but may be slower due to the 
increase in calculations performed. 
3.2 Research Strategy: Quantitative and Quasi-Experimental 
The research is quantitative in nature, as it is based around measuring the precision 
of the solution domain. The problems are emulated in a controlled environment. 
Therefore, designing of the research through the experimental methodology route is 
ideal. However, there is lack of one component of a typical experimental research, 
being presence of a control group. Therefore, this research was quasi- experimental 
in nature (Harris, et al., 2006). 
3.2.1 A Quantitative study 
Quantitative studies are concerned with proving or disproving a set of hypotheses 
based on numerical data accumulated. The studies involve observing phenomenon 
or events with the intention of applying statistical methods to aggregate and make 
logical deductions from the data collected (Suphat, 1996).  
Quantitative studies rely heavily on the collection of empirical data. This is 
often done through manipulations of a set of variables of interest to observe causal 
relationships between the subject of interest and the effect those variables have 
upon it (Jerome, 1997). Conversely, these studies can be carried out through 
observing a phenomenon as it unfolds and recording data (Jessica, et al., 2009). 
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Typically, when a new method of measurement is used or being developed, a 
quantitative study is the preferred choice as well as in situations where a new model 
is being generated (Carrie, 2007). This means quantitative studies are made to 
answer, empirically, questions posed by a research hypotheses on the occurrence of 
a phenomena and why it occurs the way it does. 
Causal relationships exist in the event where manipulation of one variable 
directly impacts the phenomena under investigation (Kosuke, et al., 2013). However, 
it should be noted that, in quantitative studies, it is always emphasised that the 
existence of correlation between the variables being manipulated and the observed 
phenomenon does not imply that causality exists between the two (BMJ Publishing 
Group , 2016). Correlation means that two observed variables have a linear 
relationship with each other over time. 
Additionally, when conducting quantitative research, if it happens that a 
certain variable of interest cannot be directly measured, proxies are used instead, 
and these then are classified as quasi-Quantitative research (The Regent of the 
University of Michigan, 2016). 
Quantitative studies are perceived to be in contrast with qualitative studies, 
which emphasise the collection of data based on how humans perceive the 
environment around them. These studies are typically devoid of using any statistical 
methods to make deductions on the data collected. There is minimal empirical angle 
to a qualitative study. Qualitative studies generally aim to develop theories about an 
occurrence and these theories are then often tested using quantitative 
methodologies. In this sense, qualitative and quantitative studies can also 
complement each other and co-exist as part of one research study (Jennifer, 2013). 
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Accordingly, this study was quantitative, as it deals with analysis of a situation 
based on empirical numerical data. This study research does not make application of 
any of the qualitative methodologies of research. 
3.2.2 An Experimental study 
Researchers who need to substantiate claims they or other researches have made 
undertake experimental studies (Paul, 2003). Additionally, researchers who need to 
evaluate models or to give strength or falsify hypotheses also prefer them (Colorado 
State University, 2016). 
Experimental research is facilitated through a variety of methodologies, 
including but not limited to, controlled experiments, field studies, computer 
simulations as well as surveys. 
3.2.3 Controlled experiments 
Controlled experiments as a subset of quantitative studies as well as experimental 
studies, deal with testing the validity of a hypothesis (Steven, 2002). In a 
comparative controlled experiment, a hypothesis is made around a baseline and this 
baseline is the accepted standard of a singularity in existence. The null hypothesis 
takes the stance that there is no difference between such a singularity and a 
proposed alternative or vice versa. The experiment is considered a success if the 
null hypothesis is validated beyond uncertainty or rejected completely (Steven, 
2002). 
A controlled experiment usually strives collectively for a few common goals. 
They usually strive to be reproducible, to give the researcher control over variables, 
manipulate those variables and record the effects of those variables on a situation. 
Additionally, controlled experiments aim to show a high level of internal and external 
validity (Victor, 2005). 
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Internal validity is the extent to which causal conclusions are free from 
experimental bias, selection bias or confounding and are at a point where no other 
variables other than the independent variable being tested have an effect on the 
dependent variable. This is a point in a study where a conclusion can be made with 
the utmost conviction that the result as observed in the dependent variable can only 
be caused by the manipulation of the independent variable (Taylor, 2007). 
On the other hand, external validity refers to the extent to which 
generalisations made in an experimental set up can hold true for a wider population. 
A study is considered a success if it has both high internal and external validity 
(Taylor, 2007). 
This study was conducted using controlled experiment approaches. 
3.2.4 Controlled Experimental design 
An experimental design can be categorised according to elements of- 
i. Dependent versus independent variables of the experiment 
ii. Single session versus longitudinal experiments 
iii. Within subjects versus between subjects experiments 
3.2.4.1 Dependent versus independent variables 
The variables in a controlled experiment can be categorised into dependent and 
independent variables. The independent variables have an impact on dependent 
variables when manipulated. As a result, dependent variables give off measurable 
data (Prabhat & Meenu, 2015). For example, in an imaginary experiment where a 
researcher would wish to know the impact of types of shoes on the performance of 
an athlete, the shoes are the independent variables and the performance of the 
athlete is regarded as the dependent variable. Influence of the independent variable 
is expected to produce a change in the independent variable. 
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In our research, the inclusion of Fuzzy Logic Systems for detection is 
regarded as the independent variation while the rate of false positives is the 
dependent variable. 
3.2.4.2 Single session versus longitudinal Experiments Design 
Longitudinal studies are most common in qualitative research. The concept of a 
longitudinal study revolves studying a subject over a long period, from an 
observational view, without much manipulation of factors or variables. This stands in 
contracts to elements of an experimental research where tweaking of variables is 
inevitable. However, the element of observing a phenomenon over a long period of 
time to record how the independent variables behave can still be applicable in an 
experimental research (Janet, et al., 2006). 
On the other hand, single session experiments are performed once over a 
short period of time and as the name suggests, typically within a single session. For 
the purposes of this study, the single session approach was chosen. 
3.2.4.3 within subjects versus between subjects Experiment Design 
In the within subject design, each participant used in the study is exposed to only 
one condition, either the condition that favours the null hypothesis or the condition 
that supports the counter argument to the null hypothesis. The advantages of this 
approach include the fact that is it easier to implement comparatively, and there is 
less risk of skill transfer among the participants from one condition to another. 
However, Inconsistency in this design tends to be high.  
Conversely, in a between-subjects-design, all participants are exposed to all 
conditions of an experiment. It is the most commonly adapted design between the 
two. Inconsistency is more controlled in this experimental design, which is caused by 
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the apparent skill transfer when participants are exposed to both approaches 
(Gideon & Jeroen, 1988). 
Our experiment for this study false under the between subjects experiment 
design as all nodes are subjected to similar encompassing conditions of the 
experiment. 
3.3 Appropriateness of the Research Design 
As explained in this study, the aim was to build an IDS and to conduct an experiment 
to determine the best way to build the threat detection module for the IDS. That is, to 
find out if using fuzzy logic for threat detection is an effective idea. Therefore, the 
research is quasi-experimental as already explained and single session. There is 
also an element of randomness, which is also often needed to quantify a study as 
truly experimental. This comes in the form of simulated attacks to the software, 
which are randomised in terms of time and frequency. 
3.4 Research Design 
An experimental study revolves around manipulation and observation of variables as 
previously mentioned. The variables in this study are the number of false positive, as 
the dependent variable, and simulated threats as the independent variable. 
3.5 Experiment Setting 
The experiment is carried out in doors on a simple desktop computer, running 
Windows 10, 8 gigabytes of RAM and a core i5 processor. There is NetBeans with 
Java 8 installed for developing the IDE. For fuzzy logic integration into java, the 
study made use of Jfuzzy lite software. All the sensor nodes are from Libelium and 
make use of the Xbee data transmitters from Digi, which transmit data through a 
modified ZigBee protocol (Libelium, 2016).  
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3.6 Instrumentation and Procedure 
The IDS, takes the form of a desktop software application, based on the need to 
create a network based IDS similar to the ones used in wired networks. Typical 
studies, in WSN security, usually bind the sensor nodes with the IDS functionality 
(Anuradha, et al., 2015). The approach used in this research, nonetheless, is 
selected for the sole intention of trying to find alternative ways to reduce the 
workload on the sensors. 
WSNs have limited processing and power capabilities, and they transmit all 
their data readings to a sink node which is usually connected to a more complete 
computer system, with highly accessible and easily renewable source of power. It 
appears, therefore, only logical to make use of this end node computer to monitor 
WSNs.  Sensor nodes are to be kept purely for sensing environmental data; for any 
application domain they are intended for. This is done in the hope that sensors retain 
their battery power longer in the field before needing a battery change. 
The IDS software in its entirety consists of three key parts. 
1. The interactive graphical user interface. 
2. The security algorithm for monitoring and detection of threats 
3. An internal database for keeping a log of sensors deployed in the field. 
This IDS is designed to work specifically with sensors that make use of the 
ZigBee protocol for communication and data transfer. 
3.7 Software Development 
The development of the software takes on the Rapid Application Development (RAD) 
approach through prototyping (Naz & M, 2015). This is because this is rather a small 
software that does not need a lot of planning before the implementation is done, 
making it an ideal platform for rapid application development 
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4. IDS Design 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the design blueprint of the system is outlined in its entirety as well as 
the algorithm foundation which inspired the algorithm being used in this project. The 
selection of the design language is made in this chapter. There is also an 
explanation of how all the parts work together to form one software piece than can 
also interact with third party applications. 
In the following chapters, the design segment will be realised as code and 
implemented as arranged out in this chapter 
4.1 Software Modelling Languages 
There are a variety of Modelling notations that can be used to model the behaviour 
of software. For example there is the Unified Modelling Language (UML), Domain 
Specific Modelling (DSM) as well as Object Process Methodology (OPM) to name 
but a few (Garcia, et al., 2014).  
Each of the aforementioned modelling languages has their merits as well as 
weaknesses when used in software design. For example, DSM has the capability to 
produce executable source code directly from the design models which reduces the 
coding work to be done by a programmer drastically, and it also produces models of 
a higher abstraction comparative (Luoma, et al., 2004).There is however, a learning 
curve that is rather steep and not necessary for such a small scale software project. 
A more standard approach is needed. 
On the other hand, OPM can represent a model of a system as a single 
graphic composed of visual graphs and textual descriptions (Berger & Dov, 2003). 
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However, the problem this study encountered with OPM is that the resulting models 
often have little association with the resulting code and the notation is not common. 
Consequently, for the purposes of displaying the IDS components, and how 
they interact as a single system, UML diagrams are used in this project.  UML is a 
standard of modelling software projects in software engineering principles that is 
more common as it has been around for quite a long time (Rumbaugh, et al., 2004). 
The major problem is that most people find UML too complex and a bit cumbersome 
as it has many different diagrams for every aspect of the software (Reggio, et al., 
2013). This problem is overcome by using just a few of the common UML notations 
in this project. 
UML diagrams can be used to depict the interaction between a user and a 
piece of software, the objects that together build the software as well as the internal 
behaviour of these objects, within the software piece. 
4.2 Modelling Behaviour of the IDS 
    4.2.1 Use Case Diagram for the IDS 
The graphical user interface (GUI) provides a window into the software through 
which a user perceives the state of the network at any given point in time. It allows a 
user to check on all sensors that are connected to and sending data in the network, 
sensors that are healthy as well as sensors that could be deemed unhealthy or 
dangerous to the network.  
The interaction between this GUI and an end user can be represented and 
modelled using a UML Use Case diagram. A Use Case diagram is a UML diagram 
that is used to model the behaviour of a system .This Use case diagram is used in a 
way which models the relationship between an actor and a system, and this actor 
can be a human or another computer system that interacts directly with a given 
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software system (Rumbaugh, et al., 2004). These Use Cases do not provide a 
detailed description of the interaction or include elements such as constraints and 
business rules but rather summarize some of the interaction between a user and a 
system (Anon., 2015). 
The following diagram shows the major interaction instances between a user 
and the Intrusion Detection System Software. 
 
Figure 4-1 IDS Use Case Diagram Depiction 
As can be seen in figure 4.1 of the Use Case Diagram, the user can interact 
with the IDS to view the initial state of the sensor network system. This particular 
instance of interaction displays to the user, the number of sensors that are sending 
data toward the computer for any purpose of which they have been deployed to a 
user. Within this usage parameter, the IDS also shows the identity descriptions of the 
nodes such as sensor ID and Mac address uniquely for each and every node in the 
network. These traits are not particularly useful to an end user but are used by the 
security algorithm within the IDS when detecting for anomalies and when correcting 
such anomalies from the sensor network. 
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The second use case scenario shows how a user of the IDS can use the 
software to monitor ZigBee sensors that are in the field. Essentially, it is the internal 
algorithm that does the work, but a system user gets to perceive the processes as 
they occur, such as capturing of identity traits for sensors, storing of active sensors 
in database, monitoring on assumed rogue nodes as well as actions recommended 
by the system within. 
Finally, the last Use Case scenario depicts that at times the user can interact 
with the system to give Over the Air (OTA) command authorizations. For example, if 
one or more nodes have been found to be faulty or proving to be hazardous to the 
network, meaning that they have been hacked and are acting maliciously, the 
security algorithm can act autonomously to issue an OTA command to either reboot 
the suspected node or to shut it down completely based on the level of discomfort it 
is causing the network. A user of the IDS is given power to authorize the sending of 
this command based on the suggestion of the algorithm. This interaction is the one 
represented by the last use case scenario. 
4.3 Activity Diagram for the IDS using Fuzzy Logic 
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Figure 4-2 The Activity Diagram for The IDS 
 
The activity diagram shows the general flow of activities that happens at each 
reading of sensor nodes by the IDS. UML Activity diagrams are behaviour modelling 
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diagrams mainly used to show the work flow of a program (Kaewchinporn & 
Limpiyakorn, 2013).  In the IDS, the first process that happens when a node first 
sends data to the gateway, is the capturing of the node description and storing such 
information in the database as part of nodes that make up the network.  
The description of the node is the node_ID as well as the Mac_adress of the 
node. If the description of the node is already a part of the network, the node 
mac_address is checked for consistency. This measure is done by the security 
algorithm. Every time a node sends data it is checked if it is transmitting using the 
same associated and recorded Mac_adress as before. If at any given time these 
parameters change, the change is recorded under frequency of change. In the case 
where the frequency of change gets above one, the fuzzy logic module of the 
algorithm is invoked.  
However, if the node is found to be operating under normal conditions, the 
data that is being transmitted by the node is accepted and stored in the database for 
third party applications to access. This data is expected to vary based on what the 
sensors are monitoring.  
After each transmission or checking of errors in the transmission signal has 
been done, the system goes back to an idle mode until the IDS is turned off by the 
application user. 
4.4 Interaction of Objects that make up the IDS 
Interaction diagrams are used to depict the way the messages flow in a system or 
software from one object to another. These diagrams also emphasise the time order 
in which messages are dispatched between the objects (Alhumaidan, 2012).  
There are generally two diagrams under UML for modelling message flow 
being sequence as well as collaboration diagrams. 
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Figure 4-3 Collaboration Diagram for the IDS Objects 
The collaboration diagram above depicts the way the objects are organised in their 
interaction to form one system. Although sensor nodes are not part of the IDS, or 
algorithm within, they sent the initial message to the network which triggers the IDS 
and subsequently the security mechanism into action. All of the actions are recorded 
in the database. 
sensor node
Security AG
FuzzyEngine
Database
1:data transmission Message()
2:Check Threat Leve()
4:record Node and Algorithm activity()
3:dispatch OTA
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Figure 4-4  Sequence Diagram of the IDS 
 
Sequence Option 1sd
Alternative sequence 1sd
Alternative sequence 2sd
SensorNode SecurityAlgorithm Fuzzy Logic Module DataBase
1 : Seding data() 2 : Node Description in DB?()
3 : no()
4 : store Node description()
5 : store transmission data()
6 : success()
7 : sending data() 8 : Node Descrption in DB?()
9 : yes()
10 : Addreses Constant?()
11 : yes()
12 : store node desciption()
13 : success()
14 : store transmission data()
15 : success()
16 : seding data frames() 17 : node description in DB?()
18 : yes()
19 : Addresses Constant?()
20 : No()
21 : add 1 to frequency of change()
22 : check for level of possible threat()
23 : check Frequency of change()
24 : level of threat based on frequency()
25 : OTA Command()
26 : OTA received()
27 : delete sensor description for node shut down()
28 : acknowledgement()
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Figure 4.4, is the sequence diagram of the IDS. It shows the order in which 
messages flow between objects to form a complete system. The system has three 
possible scenarios of operation. In Sequence option 1, the diagram depicts a 
situation in which a node is absolutely new to the network and no known information 
of the node is in the database. This also constitutes the learning stage of the 
algorithm in which every node and their initial properties are stored in the database. 
Since a new node is generally not suspected of threat, its transmission 
data(information it has gathered and sent toward the network) is accepted and 
stored in the database to be accessible to third party application that need the data. 
Alternative Sequence 1, in the diagram, shows a different scenario in which a 
node sending data to the network already has its properties recorded in the 
database. The moment a node sends data and is found to be an existing node in the 
network, its descriptive data is checked with previously recorded information to 
check if its descriptive data has remained constant. This is also the work of the 
security algorithm. This particular sequence of messages shows a scenario where 
the algorithm, having been satisfied with the state of the node, updates the database 
on the state of the network, as well as continuing to record the transmission data 
being ferried from the node. 
Finally, in Alternative sequence 2 the scenario depicted is of a node that has 
had its descriptive data changed since its last known sending session. This change 
is recorded in the database and messages sent to the fuzzy engine module to 
investigate the potential threat posed by the node. Based on the evaluation received 
from the fuzzy logic engine, an OTA command is subsequently sent to the offending 
node and a message dispatched to the database to delete all information on the 
node, if and only if, the OTA command was to shut down the node. 
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4.5 Software Development Process. 
 
Figure 4-5 RAD Prototyping, Source: Wikipedia by Unknown 
 
Figure 4-5 depicts the processes followed when developing the IDS. The moment 
the prototype iterations reach a certain satisfaction, as set by the project objectives it 
would be ready for testing. If the results from testing are good enough, the software 
could be deemed ready for end user consumption as well as in monitoring a full 
scale WSN. 
4.6 Deployment Diagram for the IDS 
 A deployment diagram is used when giving a visual scenario of the hardware 
platform on which the software will run on (Wrycza, et al., 2014). It shows a very 
highly abstract depiction of the hardware architecture arrangement. In the 
deployment diagram below, the hardware of interest are the senor nodes as well as 
the computer or server on which the application is installed on. The diagram shows 
one node as an example but it was expected that the number of nodes connected 
would be any number big enough to carry out a specific monitoring purpose. The 
user interacts with the computer which is running the application and the application 
communicates directly with the nodes through a com port on the computer. 
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Figure 4-6 IDS Deployment Diagram 
4.7 The Security Algorithm Design 
The system is built around a security algorithm concept, figure 4.7, first proposed in 
a paper that focuses on thwarting attacks aimed at ZigBee sensors (Stelte & 
Rodosek, 2013). The algorithm presented in that paper uses a different approach of 
monitoring the hash tables of the protocol to check on rogue sensor nodes that have 
changed their mac addresses. The algorithm has two stages, the learning stage as 
well as the detection stage. 
 
Figure 4-7  Security Algorithm for Detecting Flood Attacks in ZigBee WSNs 
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In this research we have used the template design paradigm of algorithm 
design, based on the above mentioned algorithm as a template. In this paradigm the 
overall flow of the algorithm is maintained but certain subclasses or modules or 
section are modified for a specific purpose such as our approach (Omics 
International, 2014). 
For starters, in this research a database is built into the IDS software so as to 
keep track of node addresses and to help the algorithm when it tracks down rogue 
nodes. Additionally, the evaluation is not done at the protocol hash tables but from 
the database. The aim is still to evaluate a threat before the hash tables crash after 
being flooded by rogue nodes. These tables keep track of all sensor nodes in the 
network as well as their associated addresses. A flood, in essence, happens when 
these tables are being forced to record more addresses than they can hold (Stelte & 
Rodosek, 2013). This happens in the window period afforded by the protocol during 
discovery, where a node answers a call from the gateway to send in data. A node 
replies by giving its mac address and node ID during the association stage. 
A rogue node can, at this point, keep answering to the association call, with 
as many different addresses as possible within a short space of time, leading to a 
rapid filling up of hash tables and eventual crash of the network.   
Lastly, this research takes into consideration that a node can be considered 
bad based on limited evaluation knowledge and therefore the algorithm is 
augmented with a fuzzy logic module to lower the possibilities of falsely claiming a 
node to be under attack.  
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
 62 
 
4.8 Development Milestones 
The development of the IDS would have to meet a few milestones before it can be 
tested, which is in essence another milestone and subsequent implementation. 
1. Java coded user Interface showing all buttons working 
2. Coded algorithm in background communicates with interface in foreground 
3. Connection of the internal database with the User interface 
4. Connection of the application with a communication port using java 
5. Capturing of the information coming through Com port by the application 
6. Separation of information contained in a packet  
7. Storing of selected data into different database tables 
8. Testing for different scenarios 
9. Completion of project 
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5. Implementation 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter looks at the implementation of the WSN security algorithm as part of a 
desktop Intrusion Detection application as well as the architectural framework of the 
solution. In section 5.2 the architecture of the IDS is outlined. The IDS algorithm and 
its enhancements are presented in this chapter as well their analysis. This chapter 
also documents the process making all the different components of the IDS to 
function as one unit. 
The desktop application software was written purely in JAVA and is adapted 
from a Java framework meant for com port programming. It monitors sensor nodes 
deployed as though in field of which, in this case, are still in a controlled indoor 
environment. These sensors are in turn sending their data readings to a computer 
through the Libelium ZigBee gateway. 
5.2 Architecture of the Intrusion Detection System Application  
 
 
Figure 5-1 IDS Architecture 
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5.2.1 Physical Layer (Libelium Waspmote ZigBee Sensors) 
The physical layer is the point through which data is collected. Sensors transmitting 
through the ZigBee 802.15.4 communication protocol make up this layer, for the 
purpose of this research. The ZigBee gateway that collects data from the sensors to 
the computer is also found at this layer. These sensors have been programmed such 
that with every data packet frame they sent, for whatever sensed data of interest to 
an end-user, they also broadcast their mac address as well as their node Id. The 
sensors are also programed to listen to OTA commands, as well as to broadcast at 
only a certain baud rate and Pan ID. This is done because they would not be able to 
find the gateway if it was on a different Pan ID. Additionally, the IDS software would 
not be able to decode the data packets if it read them at a different baud rates other 
than the one at which they are sending data. This would cause problems for the 
control layer as it would not be able to extract desired information from the packet. 
5.2.2 Application Layer (IDS) 
This particular layer can also be referred to as the presentation layer. In this level a 
GUI desktop application written in Java is found. This is the Intrusion Detection 
system software interface. This application also allows the user to make various 
operative selections such as baud rate, port selection as well as to open or close 
ports in order to control data flow. As long as a gateway is connected and sensors 
are deployed, the desktop GUI application enables the user power to monitor and 
view the data that is being sent by the sensors through the gateway. The GUI also 
issues warning to the user about any activity going wrong with the sensors, as well 
as all the actions being taken by the internal system. 
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5.2.3 Control Layer 
At the control layer, data from sensors is monitored and vital information about the 
sensors stored in the database. This layer houses the security algorithm, which is 
the control behind the IDS software. This layer is made up of the algorithm as well as 
the database.   Through this layer, other applications that may need to use the 
sensor data in a different way from the application layer can connect to the database 
and gain the information they require. Other third party applications are encouraged 
to use this database because it is often not straightforward and easy for two 
applications to access the same port simultaneously on one computer. 
The gateway connects to a port. In the case where a user needs to use 
another application that reads data from this gateway port while also monitoring the 
sensors for intrusions, they need to connect the second application to read data from 
the data storage of the IDS database such that both applications can benefit, even 
though there is one port of data entry. 
In the control layer, after data has been monitored, and in the case of 
anomalies being present in the data, the fuzzy logic module detects the anomaly and 
gives the appropriate response of which the application can communicate to the 
sensors through OTA.  
5.3 The Application 
The application connects to the same port of which the gateway is connected, and 
receives the frames as they come in and extracts the information needed in order to 
find anomalies. The anomaly of interest to this study was the ZigBee flood attack. 
Signs of its possible occurrences are monitored, from the frames being received. 
The application is in a perpetual state of checking for this anomaly, for as long as it is 
in execution. 
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This interface also allows the network administrator a graphical way of 
interacting with the network and when authorising some actions to be taken by the 
IDS, which is in essence, the security algorithm core. The GUI is the representation 
of this algorithm and not, a different part altogether. This GUI and the algorithm 
together form the IDS presented as a solution in this research project. 
 
Figure 5-2 The IDS Interface Development 
The GUI desktop Display, figure 5.3, is for information such as sensor node 
descriptions, the power level of each node, data carried by the sensors as well as 
information on sensors that the internal algorithm considers rogue or those that are 
being cut from the network, during execution. In the background is the security 
algorithm, which is registering sensor nodes and disqualifying rogue or attacked 
nodes. Security actions taken by the algorithm are also displayed on screen. 
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Figure 5-3 The IDS interface 
The solution is composed up of three parts; a desktop graphical user Interface, the 
algorithm and an in-build database. The algorithm can in turn be broken into three 
parts; learning, detection as well as response. 
5.4 Learning Segment of the Algorithm 
The learning segment of the algorithm provides a simple mechanism through which 
all the nodes connected to the network are discovered and recorded in the database. 
At the outset, the ZigBee Wasp Mote gateway sends beaconing signals in a bit to 
initiate a way for sensor nodes to discover it. For these sensor nodes to be 
discoverable, they should be on the same network as the gateway. They should also 
in turn send their association signals through the same Pan Id and baud rate as 
expected by the gateway. 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
 68 
 
  The leading task of the algorithm is to discover each and every node that 
successfully communicates with the gateway and is able to send data to the 
gateway. These sensor nodes that can connect to the gateway have been given 
association permission by the gateway to send data and are now part of the network. 
For as long as the network is functional, the algorithm goes into an iterative state of 
learning the current structure of the network with each data transmission instance. 
The learning division of the security algorithm mainly records each and every 
sensor that is making a fresh connection to the network, in a database. The nodes 
are stored using their mac addresses as well as the node ID, both of which form the 
identification trades for the nodes. The algorithm also takes measures to make sure 
that there are no nodes that are recorded more than once in the database.   
5.5 Hierarchy of Work 
In chapter 4 the sequence diagram, figure 4.4, depicts the hierarchy of work in the 
IDS. That is, it shows the sequence in which messages flow in the detection process. 
In summary, once the application is launched, the coordinator sends a beaconing 
signal of which nodes respond to with a signal showing that they are interested in 
joining the network. This is entirely the work of the ZigBee protocol. These nodes are 
individually programmed such that when association finally happens they send their 
mac address and node ID address with every packet of message they subsequently 
sent. These packets therefore contain the information gathered from monitoring a 
variable of interest as well as the addresses as one message. 
This data can be anything the sensors are deployed to monitor, be it 
temperature, soil moisture or motion detected and are not vital to threat detection. 
The IDS depends on the addresses being packaged together with the sensor data, 
for monitoring of threats. 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
 69 
 
As soon as the coordinator has sent an acknowledgement for all the nodes 
that answered the beaconing request, the security algorithm starts up to intervene 
and inspect the signals of each and every node in the transmission cycle, before 
they can be stored and processed. After the process of inspection is complete, the 
data part of the transmitted signal is stored in a database, where it can be accessed 
and used for consumption by a third party application that a user may interact with. 
At this point, rogue nodes would have been found and cleared by the IDS. 
 
ALGORITHM SEGMENT 1: Node DISCOVERY    
 
Let n be the number of nodes that have answered an association call from the 
gateway 
Let i be the node that is being read at a point in time 
1 For (int i =1; i<n; i++) 
Receive_frame  
2 If   frame_complete  
3      Extract node_mac-address 
4     Extract node_id  
5 Else discard_frame 
6 If  mac_address and node_id NOT in Learning_table  
7 Update learning_table with new mac_address and node_id 
Monitoring and Detection() //calling the detection module 
8 Else  
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discard node_address and node_ID // node is already  registered 
Monitoring and Detection() 
 
9 End if 
10 End if 
11 End while 
12 Drop table learning_database 
 
 
The IDS application is meant to be run each time a user wishes to monitor the 
sensors as deployed in the field. When the application execution is terminated, the 
learning segment of the IDS algorithm clears the contents of the database, such that 
it can learn afresh the environment the next time the application executes. This 
explains the last line of the algorithm pseudocode, which orders for the contents of 
the database to be cleared as the usage cycle has timed out. However, if the IDS is 
run from a server and used for monitoring on a continual time, this last line is not to 
be called upon, until if ever, the IDS is stopped.  
5.6 Monitoring and Detection 
The application’s main purpose is to detect signs of a flood attack that could be 
directed at a ZigBee network. Fundamentally, monitoring and detection is at the 
heart of the entire application. The following is a segment of the algorithm tasked 
with monitoring all of the nodes that are part of the network as well as detecting the 
nodes that could provide harm to the integrity of the network, and providing 
corrective solutions for those particular nodes. 
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Algorithm Segment 2: Monitoring and Detection 
 
1 Receive_frames 
2  Extract node_addresses {Mac_address and node_ID} 
3 Compare_address with data in Learning_Database 
4 If addresses NOT equal 
Calculate frequency_of_change() 
update table frequency in database} 
If   Node_Calculate_frequency ()> 1 then 
Fuzzy_reference () { 
If attack mild  
        issue warning 
      Update Database  
     Update_environment  
Else if attack_medium {reset node: drop communication} 
Else if attack_severe {isolate node: drop communication} 
} // end of fuzzy module 
Update_environment  
5 else 
Update databases   //receive the sensor data and store in database  
Update_environment  
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6 End if 
7 End if 
8 End if 
 
 
 
The algorithm starts by inspecting and comparing the sensor description, with 
respect to Mac address and node ID, to information that is in the Learning table, in 
the application database. If one or more of the nodes starts changing their 
association attributes randomly, the frequency of change is calculated and recorded 
in a separate table in the database. The fuzzy logic module is also invoked to 
monitor the level of threat as well as to provide a network correction solution. 
ALGORITHM SEGMENT 3: FUZZY LOGIC MODULE 
1. Define Linguistic variables 
2.       Define membership functions 
3.      Define rules  
4.     Use membership function plots to covert crisp input into fuzzy values 
5.    Evaluate rules in rule base based on fuzzy values 
6.   Summations of results of every rule inferred 
7. Deffuzify output (covert output to non-fuzzy values) 
 
The input for the fuzzy logic in the IDS is the measured frequency of change 
for any sensor that changes its association attributes. This value is mapped onto 
fuzzy set membership functions. If a node changes its mac address several times, it 
actually implies that the node is associating itself afresh to the gateway a lot of times. 
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This can constitute as basis for a flood attack, as one node could request attention 
from the gateway in as many times as it takes to block the gateway from discovering 
other legitimate nodes in the time cycle. In the case where there are multiple hops 
before the message is received at the gateway, it also implies that the sensors 
relaying the packets to the gateway would be kept awake by one or more rogue 
sensors and thus filling up their hash tables quicker than they can manage to hold. 
This is not desirable, as they have limited storage capacity. 
 
Figure 5-4 Fuzzy Membership Functions 
From figure 5.4, the input of frequency, on the x-axis can be mapped into one 
or more fuzzy membership functions named normal frequency, high frequency of 
very high frequency that define the level of threat a node can possess. When the 
frequency is mapped, it can be into one or more sets to a certain degree (Y-axis).For 
instance, when frequency is zero (0) it is inside normal frequency set to a full degree 
of one (1). If the reading is equal to one (1), it means that the variable input is a 
complete member of a particular set. This process of mapping an input variable into 
fuzzy membership plots is called fuzzification (Sebastian & Philip, 2014). 
With fuzzification, a value can fall into more than one membership function to 
certain varying degree. There is a general formula that is normally used to find the 
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degree into which a value falls inside different membership functions. This formula is 
explained below; 
For input value x, with c being the centre of the membership function, 
representing width of the membership function and e being the exponential function, 
the degree into which x falls inside each and every membership function,  as 
mapped on the Y-axis of the membership functions, can be calculated as follows. 
 
Equation 5.1 calculating degree of membership 
2
1
2( )
x c
x e 
 
  
   
 
As explained before, x can fall into more than one membership set, but the 
value taken is the largest of the degrees between those two or more membership 
functions, into which x participates. 
The next step in the fuzzy logic module is the definition of rules. For the 
purpose of this implementation, the rules are found as follows, where threat Zone is 
the representation of the output membership functions. 
1. If (frequency is normal Frequency) then (Threat zone is small Threat) (1)  
2. If (frequency is High Frequency) then (Threat zone is medium Threat) (1)  
3. If (frequency is very High Frequency) then (Threat zone is high Threat) (1)  
After a fuzzy input has been achieved through fuzzification, it is mapped to 
one or more of the rules in a process known as inference (Shaout, 2014).  
Once inference has been done, the output is still a fuzzy value, which should 
then be defuzzified to produce a crisp output that can be useful in subsequent 
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computations. In defuzzification, output of the inference is mapped onto the output 
member functions and a defuzzification formula is used to get the crisp output from 
the output member functions. 
 
Figure 5-5 Output Member Functions 
Figure 5.5 above shows the output member functions of the IDS. The 
inference value can fall in one or more output member functions and it has to be 
defuzzified, such as to give an output. 
Defuzzification is therefore the process we used to produce crisp output from 
fuzzy grade input. There are several ways of which this can be achieved with one of 
the popular ways being the centroid method (Saneifard, 2011). With the centroid 
method of defuzzification, for example, the centre of area or centre of gravity is 
calculated. Fuzzy membership function can take on any shape from a trapezoid, 
triangle or even a Gaussian. For either one chosen, to find the centroid all that is 
needed is the total area under the shape and the point along the x-axis at which the 
area would balance. 
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Figure 5-6 Centroid of a Shape, Source: Biomecadio.com 
Finally, after the response has been given by the fuzzy logic system, the 
application is to ignore the node that is acting up, if it assumed not capable of 
causing any significant harm by the fuzzy logic system. Conversely, a node can also 
be reset or isolated from the network entirely. To achieve this task, the application 
sends a command to the node that is affected through use of Over the Air 
programming. 
All the sensors connected to the network and which are communicating with 
the gateway can also receive commands or new programs from the user through the 
gateway using OTA. This feature allows for remote sensors to be maintained without 
physically accessing them (Quadri & Sidek, 2014). 
 
5.7 Algorithm analysis 
Asymptotic notation is used in this research to analyse the behaviour of the security 
algorithm as input eventually grows. This section establishes whether the algorithm 
will remain robust and fast as input grows. Input in this case refers to the nodes that 
have answered a beaconing request at a particular time interval and are sending 
data to the coordinator in a transmission cycle. 
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The first task to tackle is finding the number of steps the algorithm takes when 
trying to establish presence or absence, of security breaches given a reading from 
the sensor. The learning segment of the algorithm always gets called first when a 
data reading is sent towards the network and it invokes the detection module and 
subsequently the fuzzy module, if need be. 
When studying the learning segment, the first challenge is the main loop. The 
rest of the algorithm, (learning and detection) run from within this loop. When 
disregarding the entire code, within the loop, it is found that the loop has a total 4 
instructions. At the beginning there is the initialization of i (i=1) and the checking, if 
the loop is still within boundary (i< n). In this case i represents the node currently 
being probed by the algorithm out of a total of all nodes that are part of the 
transmission cycle. At the end of, each run through the body of the loop, there is 
another checking of boundary and the increment of i (i++), which essentially means 
move to the next node in the sending queue in this current transmission cycle. This 
gives a total of 4 instructions. 
When representing this as function, of the number of nodes that can be 
present at any time in the network, we get f(n) = 2+ 2n.  That is, 2 instructions that 
do not directly affect n and two more that do affect n directly. 
The next step is to find the Big-OH of the algorithm, which represents the 
worst case scenario that the system can have. To achieve this, the total number of 
instructions that can ever happen, is counted. This is represented by a case where 
the instruction steps of the algorithm fire up. These instructions are all the 
statements in the learning section, detection section as well as the fuzzy algorithm 
steps.  There are, overall, 43 instructions besides those that run the loop. The 
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function at this point can be represented as f (n) = 43 + 2 +2n, which can be 
simplified to f(n) =45 +2n. 
The calculation above shows that there are 45 +2n instructions required when 
monitoring sensor nodes for security threats in the worst case, where n is the 
number of nodes sending data towards the gateway at a point in time. 
However, this function would only hold true if we make a few assumptions. 
First, it would have to be assumed that all instructions such as extraction of node 
addresses in the learning stage, calculation of frequency of change in detection and 
monitoring as well as definition of fuzzy linguistics in the fuzzy logic module will 
happen in constant time for every node. It is also assumed that all branching 
statements defined by “if statements” would also be dealt with in constant time or 
Big-Oh (1) for every node being monitored. 
The function will therefore hold, with its approximation of 45 instructions when 
the main loop is not considered. However, all these instructions differ when 
implemented in different programming languages and are not largely dependent on 
the growth of the number of nodes that are sending messages to coordinator. 
In complexity analysis, we consider the number of instructions that grow with 
the input size. Furthermore, asymptotic notation allows us to filter out slow growing 
instructions or those instructions that do not directly affect the algorithm as the size 
of the input grows. This means the 45 instructions remain in constant time as the 
functions is refined even more. What then remains is f(n)=  2n as it has a  directly 
impact as size grows. 
Therefore, using the same logic as applied above the function is reduced to 
f(n) = n. These properties are not defined in strict mathematics but apply when 
dealing with asymptotic notation.  
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Therefore, the behaviour of f(n)= 45 +2n is described by the function f(n)= n. 
Since this was the worst-case scenario, the notation is represented as O (n). The 
security algorithm has a time complexity of O(n) owing to the fact that at the base of 
it all it employs a single loop, and several constant time instructions. An algorithm 
running in O(n) is said to be running in linear time, meaning that as the size of the 
input increases especially for a really large input factor, the running time also 
increases linearly with the input (Demaine, 2005). 
This also serves as justification for the algorithm as linear complexity time is in 
most cases, deemed desirable (Rowel, 2016). To put this into perspective, figure 5.7 
depicts generic algorithm run times.  
 
Figure 5-7 Big-Oh Chat, Source: bigohcheatssheet.com 
The algorithm can at this point be trusted to remain fast regardless of the 
number of nodes that form the network and regardless of the underlying computer 
platform on which it can be installed on. At the same time, it should be pointed out at 
this juncture that there is no additional software that is required to be in the sensor 
nodes and this goes a long way in ensuring that the battery life is optimised for 
sensing and not spend on helping the IDS with detection of threats.  
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5.8 IDS database 
A database system is the third major component of the IDS used in almost every 
stage of the security algorithm. This database was programmed to not be a 
standalone database but rather an internal database packaged together with the 
algorithm, as well as the front end GUI to make one application. 
The database has a table used when the algorithm is learning the state of the 
network. This table is used when making a record of the nodes that have responded 
to the beaconing request and have sent association signal to the coordinator to show 
that they are ready to send in data. Every node gets to have its mac_address and its 
node address recorded once. If a record of a node_ID is already in the database, it is 
not recorded again. 
Additionally, the database has a table used by the detection section of the 
algorithm, which is only used to record the nodes that have been changing their 
mac_address since the first time they were recorded. It counts the number of times a 
mac_address has changed as “frequency of change”. This information is used before 
the fuzzy logic module can be evoked. This parameter serves as input to the fuzzy 
logic module. The fuzzy logic module is only called upon by the detection section of 
the algorithm if this reading has gone above one(1), for any node under inspection. 
Finally, there is a table that records the data carried sensors and this table is 
meant to be accessed by third party applications that need the data for user 
consumption. 
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Figure 5-8 IDS Database Entity Relational Diagram 
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6. Evaluation, Discussions and Conclusions 
6.1Testing and evaluation 
In this chapter, the IDS with its detection algorithm is tested in a controlled 
environment to establish if it works as envisioned.  The chapter also presents the 
discussions points gained from the development IDS for the purpose of this 
dissertation. Future endeavours with regard to the IDS are also outlined in this 
chapter. 
In the previous chapter, it was established that the algorithm alone executes 
instructions in linear time as the size of the input grows. This theory alone makes the 
IDS practically commendable for consumption in a WSN setting where a large 
number of nodes are expected to be a part of the network. 
   6.1.1 Sensor Node Discovery 
The first test phase conducted was to check if all the nodes in the network were 
discoverable and registered in the database, every time the network was re-started. 
This is important because the anomaly detection algorithm only monitors 
nodes that are deemed part of the network. That is, only the nodes that have been 
registered into the database. 
For this particular assessment, all the nodes were first programmed such that 
they are sending data at a selected baud rate and are transmitting their addresses 
together with the data they are reporting back to the gateway.   
For this test, three (3) Libelium nodes using ZigBee Xbee transmitters were 
used and a selected number were reprogrammed to not comply with the set 
parameters necessary to be a part of the network with each iteration of the 
experiment over a period ten (10) times.  For the purposes of this experiment, the 
sensors were measuring temperature and the amount of light. 
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The IDS database was subsequently checked to determine how many nodes 
had been registered, from those deemed correctly configured. 
 
Figure 6-1 Node Discovery Bar Graph 
As perceivable from the results in the bar graph above, the algorithm managed to 
acknowledge every correctly configured node and recorded it as part of the network. 
No inactive or correctly configured sensor was every recorded or discovered as part 
of the network. 
 
           6.1.2 Anomaly Detection 
The second test of the experiment was to test the prowess of the anomaly detection 
when dealing with simulated ZigBee flood attack. This simple experiment was 
conducted by picking out one of the nodes and reprogramming it to behave as 
though it is trying to cause a flooding of the hash tables in the network. This means 
that it was reprogrammed to change its mac_address intermittently when sending 
data to gateway. 
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This was made to be slightly challenging by setting up a random delay period 
for a node to start behaving maliciously. This was to ensure that a node does not 
begin to simulate an attack as soon as the node is introduced into the network. 
The first cycle of transmission for any node is considered as the learning time 
period and the algorithm is designed not to monitor for DOS flood on the first 
transmission cycle of a node as no prior information about the node would be in the 
database.  
 
Figure 6-2 Screen Shot Of the IDS during Rogue Node Detection 
The screen shot in figure 6.2 showcases the IDS in action against a rogue node, as 
can be viewed from the end user GUI. It can be realised at this point that the node 
has sent data using a different mac address twice, meaning two mac address have 
been coming from the same source as can be deduced from the connection with the 
node ID. This in essence means that the node has managed to associate itself twice 
since its initial recognition as part of the network. It is at this point giving out false 
information about itself leading the gateway to believe that a total of 3 nodes have 
associated to the network yet it is all from one source. 
Additionally, this means that one node is able to monopolise the sending 
channel. In the event where there is a hop before reaching the gateway, the node 
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receiving data from this rogue node would eventually crash out due to having its 
limited hash table space, for storing addresses, being filled up too quickly by one 
malicious node, associating itself many times to the network. 
In the screen shot however, it can be appreciated that the IDS has captured 
this behaviour as well as the number of times the node has re-associated itself and 
the fuzzy logic as well has determined the extend at which he node can cause harm 
to the network. The fuzzy logic embedded in the algorithm also makes a 
recommendation for the node to be reset. At this point, the IDS issues an OTA to 
reset the offending node. 
  
Figure 6-3 Rogue Node Detection 
Figure 6.3 above shows a graph that was used to keep track of the number of 
packets received in a time period compared to the number of associated addresses 
behind those packets. The time units between 1 and 3 were a period within which 
the IDS was learning the network from the moment it was launched. 
From time sequence 4 to 7 the rogue node started acting up and re 
associating itself to the network. This was corrected and the chart shows a normal 
operational period between time sequences 7 to the end of the simulation period. 
Overall, for this experiment, one node was re programed to be malicious and 
re introduced to the network. After a period of time it started acting up but was 
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monitored for a limited time period by the IDS until it was reset and dropped from the 
network. 
In a bit to find as many flaws as possible, this process was then repeated for a 
minimum of 40 recorded tries, during testing using different sensor nodes as the 
rogue node for each experiment iteration and at times varying the number of rogue 
nodes. Each of those times, the rogue node was sniffed out by the IDS as can be 
seen in the chart below. 
 
Figure 6-4  Average Time for Rogue Sensor Detection 
              6.1.3 False Positives 
The fact that this was an indoor experiment or that it was a single session 
experiment and not longitudinal in nature might have hindered the presence of false 
positives. Figure 6.4 above depicts the actual number of tries this experiment was 
conducted in order to check whether within every iteration the malicious node could 
be sniffed out.  
Using the formula for measuring the false positive rate (FPR), where 
FPR=FP/(FP+TN), we find that the rate is 0 for our experiment as 0/(0+39)=0. 
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On the other hand the true positive rate for threat detection is 1 as 39/(39+0)=1.  
 
6.4 Validating the Research Assumption 
It was stated in methodology, how experiments are also conducted to determine 
whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis. In this study, based on the 
calculations on the rate of false positives, the research accepts the research 
assumption initially made in the dissertation. 
The study makes a conclusion that using the fuzzy logic as the artificial 
intelligent notation when developing a threat detection algorithm, can lead to a high 
efficiency rate, as there was lack of observable false positives during the experiment 
testing. 
6.2 Future Implementation Work 
        6.2.1 Triple Modular Redundancy Check 
Triple Modular Redundancy check is a system where three computer systems, doing 
the same process send their processing result to a singular voting computer system, 
which will takes the side of the majority between those three computers and gives it 
output (Shubham & Mahesh, 2014). 
Additionally, Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) can also be referred to as fault 
tolerant computing as the system can still work even when one of the computers is 
dead. 
The concept of TMR can be implemented together with the IDS in this 
research to further enhance the security of data collected. That is, the point at which 
data is stored for third party usage.  
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In theory, this would consist of three Xbee Cluster Heads all connected to the 
sink node and sending all their data to it. The data is checked for signs of intrusions 
as stated in this study, but the data values from all three Cluster heads are kept in a 
separate table in the database where the majority value would be considered the 
correct value to be stored and be read by the application for which the sensors have 
been deployed. 
In essence, there would be three separate networks, each governed by an 
Xbee Cluster Head, and all three networks are in the same space, measuring one 
entity and this is to ensure that data passed on for consumption is as consistent as 
possible.  
However, for this concept to work, the sensors in all three clusters would have 
to be placed relatively close to each other, as too much space would lead to 
inconsistent data. For example, in a situation where the sensors are measuring soil 
moisture after a sprinkling session, it might happen that the soil moisture is unevenly 
distributed and if sensor clusters are comprised of sensors that have too much space 
in between, all three clusters could end with different values. 
 
 
Figure 6-5Triple Redundancy Modular System of Xbee nodes 
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6.2.2 Additional Communications Protocols 
Furthermore, looking forward towards the future, we would like to include more 
protocols up for detection as opposed to just ZigBee when dealing with WSNs 
protocols such as Bluetooth and WI-FI. A protocol such as Bluetooth has been 
shown to have vulnerability issues which can be easily hacked into (Vivekparma, 
2016). It would be very good to find ways of using a similar approach to curb this 
issue. ZigBee was chosen for this research as it proved to be a cut above the rest 
when used in WSNs. 
Additionally, there are not many IDS designed specifically for use with ZigBee 
and getting a copy of the few that had proposed or designed proved to be a rather 
difficult task, meaning that it made it difficult to benchmark our approach against 
other IDS in the same domain 
6.2.3 Integration into the Framework 
One of the major future milestones of this research will possibly be the inclusion of 
this IDS into the IoT framework being designed at the Central University of 
Technology, as already stated in this dissertation (Masinde, 2013). The motivation of 
this research was ultimately the prospect of being included in the framework. 
6.3 Limitation and Challenges Faced 
Our Study into the WSN security took considerable time to take off as we could not 
find suitable sensor modes for all the novel ideas we had in mind such as the use of 
Java powered mobile agents for WSN security solutions. This is a problem that can 
be solved once we start developing localised and very flexible sensor modes. 
Secondly, the purchasing of good WSN simulators proved almost impossible 
as some were too exorbitantly expensive, some with dominant mention in general 
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literature were found to be obsolete or not optimised for the scope we were aiming 
for. On the other hand there were some manufacturers who would not find ways to 
do business with us as they were all the way in Europe. 
6.4 Discussions and Conclusions 
In this dissertation paper, an anomaly detection algorithm was adapted, and modified 
such that it can make use of logic reasoning through fuzzy logic methodologies. This 
algorithm was then included to be a part of an intrusion detection software.  
The research focused on the ZigBee protocol and its vulnerability to flood 
attacks, during node discovery and association to the network. The research then 
made a novel initiative of taking the same approach that a typical wired network IDS 
usually takes, of being actually hosted on a server or central computer system that 
managed such a network. This means that the IDS was designed to be a computer 
software not installable in sensor node themselves. It is believed that this leads to 
longer battery life for nodes in a WSN setting. 
Research in WSNs highlighted in Chapter 2, believe in the notion of tying a 
WSN security mechanism down to the node itself or at least have nodes monitor 
themselves collectively. This research hypothesizes that the separation of node from 
IDS mechanism can eventually lead to longer battery life for nodes especially based 
on the fact that nodes are often used in isolation, for example, when tracking the 
movement of a wild animal. 
Security is very important to a WSN but equally of importance is the need to 
save power which is only overshadowed by the need to also use sparingly, 
resources such as memory and processing power of a node. The fact that the sink 
node is usually connected to a computer with comparatively unlimited memory, 
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power and processing power, the research saw it fit to exploit the advantage of those 
end node computers and using them to monitor flooding threats in a ZigBee WSNs.  
In general, the research introduced an IDS methodology that makes use of a 
fuzzy logic embedded security algorithm, to monitor for threats in a ZigBee WSN by 
aggregating, making calculations and assumptions based on the information 
received from the nodes the moment they send in data from monitoring assignments.  
This IDS was fully realised in code based on the design outlined in Chapter 4 
of this dissertation. Furthermore, the algorithm was analysed using asymptotic 
notation to determine how well it fares as the number of node in a network inevitable 
explode in size. The Asymptotic calculations state that the algorithm will execute in 
linear time as the size of the network grows. This is actually a good and 
commendable time complexity for any algorithm, bettered only the time complexity of 
constant time. 
The IDS during simulation was found to be effective in capturing rogue sensor 
nodes without any problem. The IDS was tested to ascertain its usefulness in a 
controlled simulation setting. This also gives an idea as to how it will perform when 
deployed in a real world situation. 
The algorithm that makes up the IDS executes in a very promising time 
complexity meaning it will be very friendly on the RAM of any computer platform it is 
installed on. The great thing about this approach is that there is no extra code work 
that is left to be done by the nodes except the little bits of code that help them to 
broadcast their descriptive information with every data packet send, formatted in a 
way the IDS can ,make use of. 
It is also important to note that a flood attack would not be possible in the first 
place if this bit of code is excluded by an attacker. This is because of the fact that, 
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any incorrectly configured node is not recognised as part of the network, making this 
approach again, rather proficient. 
The IDS was tested against several simulated attacks and it managed to 
detect and correct the anomaly. 
 
Finally, all of the project milestones outlined in chapter were completed successfully. 
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